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We theoretically model and empirically investigate a society’s liberalization decision and its impact 
on income inequality. The motivation is that a blanket conclusion that globalization increases 
inequality within countries can be misleading. In the paper, the decision of the society rests on the 
pre- and post-liberalization utilities of different segments, and, complying with stylized facts, the 
economy’s structure follows Kuznets’ predictions on industrialization and urbanization. Our 
findings support the line of research which emphasizes the importance of country-specific factors in 
prescribing policies. In particular, countries are more likely to open up when relative productivity 
of migrant ex-rural workers to those of initial urban workers in manufacturing, β, is high, and the 
society’s tastes for the agricultural goods, α, are not particularly strong.  Following liberalization, 
the income distribution too improves if α is low and β is high. Empirical results show that open 
economies, ceteris paribus, have 3- 4 higher Gini points than closed economies. In developing 
countries except Sub-saharan Africa, β can offset this stand-alone effect just after the switch if the 
switch is made with a minimum β value of 0.67 – 0.89, while in Sub-saharan Africa, this stand-
alone effect can be offset in 10-15 years after the switch. Overall, however, the β effect cannot 
surpass the stand-alone effect in the whole sample, which implies that the median country has made 
a “wrong” switch.  
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... it is not whether you globalize that matters, it is how you globalize (Rodrik, 1998). 
 
 [Industrialization and urbanization] perforce bring about a decline in the relative position of 
one group after another - of farmers, of small scale producers, of landowners. ... The continuous 
disturbance of preexisting relative position of the several economic groups is pregnant with conflict 
- despite the rises in absolute income or product common to all groups (Kuznets, 1973). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The belief that liberal and global policies have significantly contributed to the worsening of 
inequality within countries and in the world has become a conventional wisdom. The 
following quote from Human Development Report of the United Nations (1999) epitomizes 
this belief: 
  
 Driven by technocrats, the changes [in these countries' trade regimes toward more 
global policies] were supported by the IMF and the World Bank as part of comprehensive 
economic reform and liberalization packages. ... The new rules of globalization focus on 
integrating global markets, neglecting the needs of people that markets cannot meet. The 
process is concentrating power and marginalizing the poor, both countries and people. 
 
Is it true that inequality within countries (and in the world) worsens as countries integrate 
more to global markets? Or, could there be cases as well where, as a country integrates to 
global markets more, all segments in the society improve their well-being in the absolute 
sense and the poorest segments improve their welfare in the relative sense?  
 
Table I in Appendix A summarizes 91 countries’ journey with income inequality over the 
period 1959 to 2003. The outlook is that while 36 countries have experienced a net rise in 
inequality over this period, 42 countries experienced a net fall, and 13 countries 
experienced no change. Sub-dividing the sample into developing, developed and Sub-
saharan African country groups reveals that the cases of “net rise” are close in numbers to 
the cases of “net fall” for each group. The same comparison can also be made for 63 
“open” economies, where the years of openness are given by Sachs and Warner (1995) and 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003). In this class of countries, 25 cases of “net rise” are 
accompanied by 30 cases of “net fall” and 8 cases of “no change”. Group-wise divisions 
uncover similar results; indeed, the “net rise” and “net fall” cases stand both at 13 for 
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developing countries. These comparisons are by all means rough, where the changes in 
inequality are not conditioned on any other variable. However, this very situation implies 
that the gait of inequality requires a deeper analysis. Given that an important portion of the 
world’s population is considered still as closed, and that those countries will face pressures 
to open,1 the impact of liberalization on inequality has to be investigated more rigorously. 
 
We believe that without taking into account the countries’ internal dynamics, a blanket 
conclusion on the effects of liberalization on inequality would be at least premature and 
biased, if not wrong. In reaching a conclusion, countries’ human capital stock, social 
divisions, sectoral characteristics, cultural affinities and political and economic support 
systems need to be accounted for. In fact, there is a growing interest in the literature on the 
role of country-specific factors and local knowledge in designing institutions (see Rodrik, 
2000). Thus, our aims in this paper are twofold. First, by defining liberalization as a switch 
from an import substitution (IS) to an export promotion (EP) regime, we aim to identify 
theoretically and empirically the circumstances under which different segments in a society 
would (or would not) support liberalization. Second, and at least equally importantly, we 
aim to identify theoretically and empirically the circumstances under which the within-
country inequality would decrease (or increase) after a switch. 
 
A prudent analysis of global economic integration and institutional switch should utilize a 
political economy framework, in which the society’s decision whether or not to integrate to 
global economy is modelled endogenously. The ideal scenario would be that, if such 
integration is to take place, various segments in the society reach a unanimous decision. 
Full popular support and legitimacy of the switch are important, because many developing 
countries lack the social insurance that could cushion the possible blows of such a switch. 
Indeed, the backlash of masses in many countries against the distributional and social 
consequences of globalization has indicated that “global economic integration needs an 
infrastructure of popular support and legitimacy in order to survive” (Rodrik, 1998). 
“[E]ven in a dictatorship, distributional issues affecting the majority of the population will 
influence policy outcomes” (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).  
                                                          
1 In the Sachs-Warner-Wacziarg-Welch context of openness, 35 countries are classified as closed as of 2003 
(see Table I in Appendix A). Total population of these countries in 2000 was three billion, which is nearly 
half of the world’s population. Of this amount, 2.3 billion is constituted by China and India, though there is a 
disagreement between Sachs-Warner and Wacziarg-Welch on India’s openness. The rest 33 countries make 
up a population of 700 million.  
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Our deeper framework owes its genesis to Kuznets. The theoretical model disaggregates 
the society into four segments: entrepreneurs, workers, high-type farmers and low-type 
farmers.2 In IS, entrepreneurs and workers produce a manufacturing good, and the farmers 
produce an agricultural good. In this regime the society makes the choice of whether or not 
to switch to EP, where each segment makes their decision by comparing their current utility 
in the IS regime to their potential utility in the EP regime. Thus, the society is assumed to 
be rational and forward-looking. Complying with the stylized facts, in EP, the agricultural 
good is imported and the manufacturing good is exported. This, in turn, induces higher 
productivity farmers to become new workers in EP. As suggested by Kuznets, these ex-
farmers (i.e., the new immigrant workers), however, are assumed to be (at least initially) 
less productive than the initial workers. Therefore, in the model, β measures the relative 
productivity differences between rural and urban populations. Another relevant parameter 
is α, which is the share of agricultural goods in the consumption basket of the society 
(broadly, the countries’ affinity to rural way of life). 
 
Consequently, α and β turn out to be two crucial factors on the society’s switching decision 
as well as on the pace of inequality after an IS-EP switch. The theoretical results suggest 
that low-type farmer never have incentives to switch. High-type farmers, however, have 
higher incentives to switch to EP as α decreases and β increases. Entrepreneurs and initial 
urban workers always obtain higher utility in EP, thus they support the switch regardless. 
Thus, if the society requires a unanimous decision and one segment opposes the switch, 
then clearly the country will remain in IS. The alternative is a majority rule: if the 
entrepreneurs and workers constitute the majority the country will switch to EP, but if the 
low-type farmers are the majority the country stays in IS. When these two groups do not 
have the majority, the high-type farmers will serve as the tie-breakers and their decision 
will depend on α and β. The same results follow if the median-voter decision rule is used. 
A very important result is that inequality, too, will depend on α and β; it will decrease 
following a switch if α is low and β is high and will increase otherwise.  
 
It must be noted that α and β are two very crucial variables. α represents the societies’ 
affinity to rural way of life and thus indicates their competition capability with international 
players. β, on the other hand, is an indicator of institutional and infrastructural solidarity 
                                                          
2 Further disaggregation of the societal segments is possible, but that would change our focus. We discuss the 
implications of this in Section 2.5.  
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within a country. Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2005) find that β is determined by labor and 
credit market institutions, legal system, physical infrastructure and other demographic and 
geographical characteristics of the countries.  
 
Using the newest inequality data assembled by the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (WIDER - dated June 2005), we next carry out an empirical test on 
these predictions. We see this empirical analysis as a complementary instrument for the 
model, which “fine tunes” the theoretical implications by taking into account the data. The 
predictions are tested for around 30 developing and 13 Sub-saharan African countries that 
had a switching experience in the past. The population of these countries at the time of their 
switch totals up to 1.2 billion (it is 2.2 billion if we include India). The short-term and 
broader term implications of the switch are also explored.3  
 
The data speak up. We find that while the low-type farmers of the developing countries are 
not forward-looking in the short-term (providing positive support to the switch), the high-
type farmers are always rational (their incentives increase in β and decrease in α). The low-
type farmers in Sub-saharan Africa however, are always rational (providiving negative 
support to the switch). The high-type farmers in this continent are rational in terms of β in 
longer term, but irrational in terms of α. Moreover, urban workers provide a positive 
support to the switch in both groups of countries, but only in the short term. 
 
The results on inequality are even more interesting. Higher β lowers inequality after the 
switch in both groups of countries. However, the impact in developing countries is realized 
mostly in the short term, while it is spread across time in Sub-saharan Africa. At median β 
and migration rate, β lowers Gini by 4 – 6 points in developing countries. Controlling for 
region-specific characteristics lowers this effect to 3 –5 points. In addition, higher α may 
lead to higher inequality in Sub-saharan Africa after the switch, with no effect observed in 
developing countries. The overall effect is moderated by region-specific characteristics. 
 
Another important result is on the stand-alone inequality effect of the switch when other 
things are held constant. We find that EP regimes, on average, have worse inequality than 
                                                          
3 Short-term implications refer to the implications around the switching period (i.e., a time period that is five 
years before the switch and five years after the switch). For longer term  the time period is “zoomed out” (i.e., 
the last 20 years before the switch and the first 20 years after the switch).  
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the IS regimes in the long term (i.e., 15-20 years after the switch). Such an effect is 
insignificant when the attention is restricted to a short period after the switch. Specifically, 
the EP regimes have 5-7 higher Gini points than the IS regimes when region-specific 
characteristics are not accounted for. Controlling for these effects, the difference is realized 
as 3 - 4 points. These results hold for both developing and Sub-saharan African countries. 
All these imply that, in developing countries β can offset the stand-alone effect in the short 
term if the switch is made with a minimum β value of 0.67 – 0.89, given median migration 
rate. In Sub-saharan Africa, the stand-alone effect can be offset by the median β in 10-15 
years after the switch. Overall, however, when the estimates are evaluated in the whole 
sample, the β effect cannot surpass the stand-alone effect. This implies that the median 
country has made a “wrong” switch. 
 
In Section 2 we present our theoretical model. Econometric specification and methodology 
are described in Section 3.  Section 4 explains the construction of certain variables. Section 
5 presents the results. Section 6 includes a robustness analysis, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
As alluded to in Introduction, in our model entrepreneurs, workers, high-type farmers and 
low-type farmers constitute the segments in the society, with farmers producing the 
agricultural good and entrepreneurs and skilled workers producing the manufacturing good. 
1-A fraction of agents consists of entrepreneurs and skilled workers; the remaining A 
fraction of agents consists of farmers.  For convenience, we will assume that there are equal 
numbers of entrepreneurs and skilled workers (i.e., the entrepreneurs and workers will each 
constitute (1-A)/2 fraction of the society4 - this specification also allows for multiple 
entrepreneurs as well as skilled workers per firm). On the other hand, in time some farmers 
will join them as unskilled workers. 
 
Initially, the country’s regime is IS where the agricultural good’s domestic price is above 
that good’s world price and the manufacturing good’s domestic price is equal to that good’s 
world price. If the country switches to EP, it will start exporting the manufacturing good,5 
                                                          
4 Without this assumption, Gini comparisons between two regimes become completely unmanageable (as will 
be seen, the model entails many other crucial parameters). 
5 Manufactured exports as a percentage of total exports in many developing countries increased dramatically 
over time.  In 1965, this ratio was 46% for Taiwan, 52% for S. Korea, 29% for Singapore and 5% for Brazil.  
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and will allow importing the agricultural good6 at an international price which is lower than 
the domestic price.  As a result, it will turn out that, ensuing the regime switch, some 
portion of the agricultural labor will find it in their interest to migrate to the manufacturing 
sector to become inexperienced workers (to be made precise later) in that sector. 7 
 
In order to find out whether a particular segment will be willing to support the IS-EP 
switch - and to facilitate income distribution comparisons between the two regimes- we 
need to first establish the income and utility levels of all agents in each regime. 
 
2.1. Agriculture in IS 
A farmer uses his labor8, e.  The production function he faces, (ea)1/2, exhibits diminishing 
marginal product of labor (hence, the amount of land used is suppressed, being normalized 
to one unit).  A farmer’s total income in IS is 
YaIS = pad (ea)1/2.  
where pad is the domestic price of the agricultural good, which embodies all agricultural 
supports.9 Due to such high agricultural prices, farmers are not willing to migrate in IS. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
In 1990, the ratio has become 93% for Taiwan, 94% for S. Korea, 73% for Singapore and 53% for Brazil (see 
Table 12.2 in Todaro, 2000). 
 
6 Developing countries’ comparative disadvantage in agricultural goods deteriorated significantly in time.  
Todaro (2000, Ch. 10) reports that “[i]n 1960, ... agricultural labor productivity in developed countries was 
more than 13 times that in the less developed countries.  By 1995, this productivity gap had widened to more 
than 50 to 1.”  (see Table 10.3 in  Todaro, 2000). 
 
7 As a result of this internal migration, the populations in 1975 and 1999 of some cities in developing countries are 
as follows (in millions):  
  Lagos Dhaka Delhi Jakarta 
1975        3.3         2.2  4.4   3.8  
1999 12.8 11.7 11.3 10.6 
(See Table 6 in UN’s World Urbanization Prospects: The 1997 Revision).  In many developing countries, share of 
the urban population growth due to migration has been about 50% or more  (see Table 8.4 in Todaro, 2000). 
 
8 The farmer is a representation of a household farm.  Behrman (1999, p. 2877) conveys Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig’s (1986) claim: “[t]he dominance of the household farm in developing country agriculture is due, 
at least in part, to household enterprises being able to deal relatively well with incentives for efforts in 
difficult-to-monitor tasks.”  In addition, “In ... farming, [the] management skill is combined with the farm 
household’s own labor power” (Timmer 1988, p. 294). 
9 The international prices of agricultural goods have been vastly (i.e., about 50% - see Baffes and Meerman, 
1997) less than those in the markets of developing countries that protected their domestic markets. In 
developing countries such price differentials persisted for a long time despite extensive subsidization of 
agricultural inputs, including fertilizer, irrigation, seeds, electricity, credit and insurance. Even in Turkey, 
which is about to start accession negotiations with the European Union, the subsidies and price supports in 
agriculture account for 4% of GDP. Given that the agricultural sector accounts for the 12% of GDP, one can 
see that overall one third of the agricultural prices received by the farmers is due to government support (see 
p. 82-83 in Dervis et al, 2004).   
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A farmer’s utility function is 
ua(L,a,m) = La aaα ma1-α where La = 1-ea and 0 < α < A. 
 
2.2. Manufacturing in IS 
A manufacturing firm in IS too faces the same production function, (em1/2), where e denotes 
a skilled worker’s labor (thus, the amount of capital used is suppressed by normalizing to 
one unit.)  A firm’s profit πm per entrepreneur in IS is 
πmIS = pm (em)1/2 - wm em 
where pm is the price of the manufacturing sector’s product and wm is the manufacturing 
wage (recall that in our model there is one skilled worker per entrepreneur). Thus, although 
the marginal product of each worker is decreasing as in the agricultural sector, there will be 
constant returns to scale in production (which will be relevant in EP).10 
We will use the normalization pm = 1, which is also presumed to be equal to the 
world price of the manufacturing good.  Hence, the domestic firm is able to supply its 
product at the world price. 
An entrepreneur’s utility function is given by 
ue(L,a,m) = L aeα me1-α.  
Assuming, for simplicity, that each firm only uses workers’ labor, entrepreneur’s 
leisure, L, is equal to one (i.e., an entrepreneur does not provide labor). 
Thus, an entrepreneur’s income is 
YeIS = πmIS.    
A (skilled) worker’s utility function is 
uw(L,a,m) = L aα m1-α where L = 1-ew. 
Thus, in the absence of entrepreneurs’ labor, the entire manufacturing labor will consist of 
skilled workers’ labor in IS (i.e., em will only entail ew). 
A skilled worker’s income is 
YmIS = wm ew. 
 
2.3. Equilibrium and Income Distribution in IS 
In IS, domestic prices must clear the agricultural and manufacturing goods markets as well 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
10 Many studies (such as Burnside 1996, Harrigan 1999, Martin-Marcos and Suarez-Galvez 2000, Truett and 
Truett 1997) find robust evidence that a typical manufacturing industry displays constant returns to scale in 
various developed and developing countries. 
 9
as the labor market.  Proposition 1 in Appendix B, using Walras’ law, finds that YeIS = YwIS 
> YaIS. It also reveals that the absolute as well as relative income of a farmer increases in 
α/A.11  Proposition 2 in that appendix establishes that ueIS > uwIS > uaIS.   
 
The structure of the IS regime is straightforward.  This allows us to obtain a very simple 
expression that measures the Gini coefficient in that regime (it will, however, not be the 
case in the EP regime).  Proposition 3 in Appendix B finds that the Gini coefficient in IS is 
equal to A – α. As well-known, a higher Gini coefficient means a higher income inequality.  
Thus, the Gini coefficient (and the measure of inequality) decreases in α (i.e., in the share 
of the agricultural tastes in the society, which increases farmers’ incomes) and increases in 
the fraction of the agricultural population A.  Indeed, there is no inequality if α = A and the 
inequality approaches its highest possible level (i.e., a Gini coefficient of A) as α tends to 0. 
 
2.4. Agriculture and Manufacturing in EP 
As mentioned above, we assume that pm = 1 is equal to the international manufacturing 
good price12 and the international agricultural good price, pai, is less than pad.  A la Kuznets, 
a central feature of our model is that, if the IS-EP switch takes place, the new 
inexperienced workers (i.e., farmers who migrate to the city) may not be as productive as 
the initial skilled workers.  In particular, for simplicity we assume that in the agricultural 
sector that are two types of farmers: the low-type (i.e., less educated) ones and the high-
type (i.e., more educated) ones. 
 
The low-type farmers are assumed to have a manufacturing productivity which is ε fraction 
of that of an initial skilled worker, where 0 < ε < pai.  The high-type farmers are assumed to 
have a manufacturing productivity which is β fraction of that of an initial skilled worker, pai 
                                                          
11 α is the share of agricultural goods in the consumption basket of the society and as such denotes the 
farmers’ receipts. α/A then denotes the agricultural income per percentage unit of the population and the 
ability of the agricultural population to sustain based on the agricultural consumption in the society. 
 
12 Note that we model a period around a switch from IS to EP. By this  time, heavy protection in 
manufacturing, which was the essential feature of early phases of the IS regimes, might have decreased and 
domestic prices might have approached to international prices due to the countries’ need to export and 
eliminate foreign exchange bottlenecks and macroeconomic instabilities. In addition, this assumption is very 
much related to light manufactures such as textiles, footwear, furniture and some parts used in the production 
of other manufactures. Given relatively high transport costs of these items compared to their values, the 
producer countries can function as local export centers vis-a-vis their neighbors. Even when the domestic 
prices of these goods can be somewhat higher than their international prices, some subsidy from the 
government might help the domestic producers in exporting their products to their neighboring countries. The 
latter idea is in line with domestic prices of manufacturing goods being close to international prices.  
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< β < 1.13   The high-type farmers constitute k fraction of all farmers (and, thus, kA fraction 
of the society) and thus the low-type farmers constitute the remaining 1-k fraction of 
farmers (and, thus, (1-k)A fraction of the society). 
 
The farmers who do not migrate after the switch will continue producing agricultural good 
at pai, rather than at pad.  Thus their income will be lower than their income in IS since YeIS 
= pad e1/2 = pad (1/2)1/2 > YeEP = pai e1/2 = pai (1/2)1/2  
 
The relative productivity coefficients ε and β of the migrant workers can be easily 
recognized by the entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector and thus they will be reflected 
in these agents’ manufacturing wages, if they indeed choose to migrate. That is, suppose a 
migrant worker with β relative productivity and a skilled worker work the same number of 
hours, e; then a migrant worker will earn (e β w) as a skilled worker will earn (e w). A brief 
review of Proposition 2 (and its proof) in Appendix B will reveal that due to the Cobb-
Douglas form of the utility functions all workers choose to work the same number of hours 
regardless of their wage.  Therefore, the low-type workers’ income when they continue to 
be farmers in EP, YeEP = pai e1/2 = pai (1/2)1/2, will surely exceed the possible urban income 
of the low-type farmers, YnEP(ε) = en ε wm = ε ½ (½).1/2  In addition, when the skilled 
worker and each high-type migrant worker work e hours for an entrepreneur, the total 
productivity of all workers in that firm will be (1 + 2Aβk/(1-A)) times of the productivity 
of the skilled worker.14  Thus, with the skilled worker and the high-type migrant workers, 
the profit function of the firm per entrepreneur will be 
 
πmEP = (1 + 2Aβk/(1-A)) (em)1/2 - wm (1 + 2Aβk/(1-A)) em 
In EP, only the labor market needs to clear.  In the product markets, the international prices 
prevail.  Consequently, Proposition 4 in Appendix B finds that YeEP > YwEP > Yn
EP(β) > 
Ya
EP(ε) and that YnEP(β) > YaEP(β) and YnEP(ε) < YaEP(ε), where n denotes the “new” 
                                                          
13 In IS we assume that ε and β do not affect the agricultural output.  The reason for this assumption is the low 
rates of private returns to schooling in rural areas. This pattern of lower returns to schooling has been 
frequently noted in the literature (see Schultz (1988) as well as the references therein). Schultz (1988), Ribe 
1979 and Yap 1977 imply that in general the difference in the number of years of schooling of rural born and 
urban born remains to be the main reason for the productivity differences of them in urban areas. 
 
14 1+2Aβk/(1-A) follows from the fact that there is one skilled worker per entrepreneur and kA/[(1-A)/2] 
migrant workers per entrepreneur (the latter follows from the fact that the high-type migrants constitute kA 
fraction of the society). 
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(i.e., high-type migrant) worker, and ε and β in the parentheses denote the type of the 
agents who were farmers in IS. It also finds that the absolute (as well as relative) income of 
each migrant worker increases in the relative productivity parameter, β, of the high-type 
migrant. Thus, the income inequality in urban areas will increase as a result of migration 
(however, migration will decrease the overall inequality in the society). Kuznets (1955) 
noted that “when industrialization and urbanization were proceeding apace and the urban 
population was being swelled, and fairly rapidly by immigrants... from the country’s 
agricultural areas ... the urban population would run the full gamut from low-income 
positions of recent entrants to the economic peaks of the established top-income groups.”   
 
Proposition 5 in Appendix B (not surprisingly) reveals that in EP, ueEP > uwEP > unEP(β) > 
uaEP(ε),  In addition, it finds that unEP(β) > uaEP(β) and unEP(ε) < uaEP(ε).  That is, the high-
type farmers will be better off migrating to the manufacturing sector rather than staying in 
the agricultural sector.  For the low-type farmers, however, the opposite will hold because 
of their low relative urban productivity coefficient.  The result below compares each 
agent’s utility in IS and EP. 
 
THEOREM 1: (1) ueEP > ueIS, uwEP > uwIS,  uaEP(ε) < uaIS(ε). 
(2)[unEP(β)- uaIS(β)] increases in β and decreases in α. 
 
This result follows directly from the proofs of Propositions 2 and 5 in Appendix B. Thus, 
the IS-EP switch benefits the entrepreneur and the skilled worker regardless of the 
parameters.  The entrepreneur becomes better off for two reasons: in EP, he earns more and 
spends less for the agricultural good. The skilled worker becomes better off even though 
his income does not change in EP; he becomes better off because he now spends less on the 
now cheaper agricultural good under EP.15  Note that [unEP(β)- uaIS(β)] represents the high-
type farmer’s propensity to support the switch and that it increases in β and decreases in α. 
 
2.5. Political Economy of the Switch and Migration 
Whether the high-type farmers support the switch or not, they will be better off migrating 
                                                          
15As is well known in the Economic History Literature, in England, “[a]t the end of the French Wars in 1815 
the Corn Laws were introduced.  They stated that no foreign corn could be imported into Britain until 
domestic corn cost 80s per quarter.  The high price caused the cost of food to increase...  The Corn Laws ... 
caused great distress among the working classes in the towns” (The Victorian Web,  
http://www.victorianweb.org/ history/cornlaws1.html). 
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to the manufacturing sector if the switch takes place, since after the switch they will earn 
less in agriculture than in the manufacture (as pai < β). The low-type farmers, on the other 
hand, will end up being worse off in EP compared to how they fared in IS since 0 < ε < pai. 
Consequently, since migrating to the manufacturing sector will make them even worse, and 
they will choose not to migrate. 
 
Combining the results of Proposition 5 in Appendix B and Theorem 1 above, we have the 
following result concerning the choices of different segments of the society as to whether 
or not to support the switch as well as the choices of the two-types of farmers as to whether 
or not to migrate. 
 
COROLLARY 1: (1) Regardless of the parameters, the entrepreneurs and workers 
will support the switch from IS to EP but the low-type farmers will not. 
(2) The high-type farmers will support the switch from IS to EP with a higher 
propensity as β increases and α decreases. 
(3) As a result of the switch from IS to EP, the high-type farmers will choose to 
migrate but the low-type farmers will choose not to migrate. 
 
A tie-break rule is implicit in Part 2 of the above corollary.  The tie-break rules will be 
necessary below too.  Part 1 of the above corollary implies that a unanimous decision by all 
segments of the society concerning the IS-EP switch is not possible unless k = 1: The low-
type farmers will oppose this switch regardless.  The high-type farmers too may oppose this 
switch under certain circumstances. 
 
There is a variety of political decision-making processes that can be considered here.  The 
two most prominent such processes used in the literature are the majority vote and median 
voter setups.16 It would be desirable that the largest possible majority favors the decision, 
but it is also conceivable that the segments that stand to gain or lose more from such a 
switch may influence the political process more. The most extreme version of this 
influence would be in the form of a coup that can be staged with the support of these 
                                                          
16 Cukierman and Spiegel (2003) investigated the circumstances under which these two setups’ outcomes 
would coincide. Their findings imply that, in simple frameworks such as ours, these two setups lead to similar 
policy choices by the society. 
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segments.17 A less extreme version of such an influence can be due to lobbying activities 
which these segments can afford.  A much milder version of such an influence would be in 
the form of these segments’ voting with higher probability than the segments with much 
less “at stake” from such a switching decision.18  In other words, in the latter framework, it 
is not only the population fractions but also the relative gains and losses of various 
segments from the voting outcome that matters - whereas when the majority vote or median 
voter setup is used it is only the population fractions of various segments that matters. 
 
Note that α and β do not affect any of the segments’ population fractions.  In addition, as α 
decreases, the propensity of each segment to support the switch increases; i.e., the gain 
from the switch increases or the loss from the switch decreases.  Likewise, as β increases, 
the propensities of the entrepreneurs and high-type farmers to support the switch increase 
and those of the remaining two segments remain unaffected (see the corresponding 
segments’ utility functions Propositions 2 and 5 in Appendix B). Thus, concerning a fairly 
large class of political decision-making processes, we obtain the following general result 
considering the effects of α and β on the society’s switching decision: 
 
 THEOREM 2: Consider any political decision-making process to be used in our 
framework such that its outcome relies only on all segments’ population factions and/or 
propensities to support switching vs. not switching. Then, as β increases and α decreases, 
the society is more likely to switch. 
 
One can argue that the main cleavage in terms of society’s support for the switch is 
between the entrepreneurs and workers on one side and the low-type farmers on the other 
side, and that entrepreneurs and workers may not always support the switch. Indeed, the 
real cleavage should be passing through a plane with infinitely many dimensions, because 
the manufacturing sector involves a continuum of entrepreneurs and workers that will gain 
from exporting in EP and those that will lose due to severe foreign competition. Likewise, 
not all agricultural goods need to be imported upon opening. The producers of the 
agricultural goods that will be exported in EP are expected to be pro-EP but the others may 
not be pro-EP. One can surely consider a much disaggregated model where all such sectors 
                                                          
17 For instance, the switch to EP took place during the military regime following a coup in 1980 in Turkey. 
 
18 See Anbarci, Escaleras and Register (2005) for the details of such an “at stake theory of voting.” 
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are explicitly incorporated and use a vast array of manufacturing and agricultural goods 
rather than composite goods, but such a detailed model will not be able to highlight the role 
and interactions of α and β. In addition, data for α and β at such disaggregation are not 
available for empirical analysis. Moreover, the fact that manufacturing exports by 
developing countries are booming (see Footnote 5) and that agricultural productivity (hence 
and exports) in developing countries is constantly regressing (see Footnote 6) provide the 
hints that overall entrepreneurs and skilled workers in manufacturing would be major 
beneficiaries of EP, while most farmers would tend to lose in EP.  
 
2.6. Inequality Before and After the Switch 
Let YIS = (YeIS, YwIS, YaIS) be the income vector in IS and YEP = (YeEP, YwEP, YnEP(β), 
YaEP(ε)) be the income vector in EP. Let G(YIS) denote the Gini coefficient in IS and 
G(YEP) denote the Gini coefficient in EP.  Inequality after the switch will decrease if 
G(YEP) - G(YIS) < 0. For the change in Gini, some parameters affect only G(YIS) and some 
others affect only G(YEP) whereas some parameters affect both. The Gini coefficient’s 
numerator consists of pair-wise income differences of any two segments of the society, 
multiplied by these segments’ relative population shares, while its denominator consists of 
the average income in the society. 
 
THEOREM 3: Consider a switch from IS and EP. Gini will increase in α and 
decrease in β, regardless of the other parameters. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Empirical implications of our theoretical model are on α and β. Consequently, we take the 
following route in the set-up: We first test whether the switch takes place given the choice 
of the segments of the society: for a high-type farmer a high β is likely to facilitate the 
switch while a high α is likely to hinder it; for a low-type farmer the switch is always 
undesirable; and for an urban worker the switch is always desirable. We assume that the 
entrepreneurs can neither constitute the majority, nor can be the MV in the society, so we 
do not include them in the empirical analysis. Second, we test the migration behavior of 
both types of farmers once the switch occurs: high-type farmers are likely to migrate out of 
agriculture with the switch, while low-type farmers are likely to stay in agriculture. Third, 
we investigate which way inequality in the society changes after the switch: the society is 
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more likely to end up with a lower inequality with higher β and lower α.   
 
While the purpose of the empirical analysis is to cross-check the signs of the theoretical 
variables with data, equally importantly the empirics can indicate certain threshold values 
of β, at which Gini alters its direction after the switch. These values should be important for 
currently closed countries that are considering or are under pressure to open. It is also 
important to note that the theoretical model is a construct involving several assumptions. 
Therefore, unexpected signs are very well possible, primarily due to the complexity of the 
real world phenomena. In this sense, our empirical analysis also aims to “fine tune” the 
theoretical implications by taking into account the data. In case unexpected signs are found, 
what is of interest is to ponder upon the implications of these signs, which would deepen 
our understanding of the channel proposed as well as help suggest policies on that basis.  
 
3.1. Econometric Specification 








where i is a subscript for countries and t is for time, ISEP is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 0 under IS and 1 under EP, FMV is a dummy that shows if the MV or the 
majority is the farmers, HT and LT denote the high-type and low-type farmers, 
respectively, WMV is a dummy to show if the MV or the majority is the workers, α is the 
share of agricultural goods in the consumption basket of the society, β is the relative 
productivity of the migrant worker to that of the initial worker, MIGRATION is the rate of 
migration of the labor force out of agriculture, GINI is income Gini of each country, and X, 
Y and Z are the vector of control variables in the respective equations.  
 
The year of institutional switch for ISEP is determined according to Sachs and Warner 
(1995), whose analysis is re-investigated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). FMV takes the 




























otherwise. WMV takes 1 if the agricultural labor force is less than 50%. This takes care of 
both the MV and the majority voting cases. α is proxied by the share of agricultural value 
added in GDP plus the share agricultural imports in GDP and minus the share of 
agricultural exports in GDP. We measure β with the ratio of rural to urban years of 
schooling. The measurement of this variable has several adjustments in several cases (such 
as the one between βIS and βEP) and we explain these in Section 5 below. Our empirical 
measure for the low-type farmer (LT) is the share of rural population with no schooling. 
The high-type farmer (HT) can be measured with either the share of rural population with 
primary schooling or secondary schooling. We leave it to data to decide who the high-type 
farmer is. Migration is the rate of decline in the agricultural labor force, adjusted for 
population, and the construction follows Larson and Mundlak (1997). 
 
In the first equation we model the endogenous choice of the MV or the majority in 
selecting the regime. We first divide the labor force into agricultural and non-agricultural 
(FMV vs WMV). If the MV or the majority is the farmers, then the political power lies 
with them, and vice versa. The first composite regressor in this equation tests the stance of 
the low-type farmers towards the switch, while the next two regressors capture the decision 
of the high type farmers. Note that the decision of the high-type farmers relies on α and β, 
and these variables are interacted with HT. It happens to be the case that mostly and 
robustly the share of rural population with secondary schooling provides the predicted 
signs in the regressions. So, investing some belief into the model, we conclude that it is the 
secondary schooling that draws the line between the low-type and the high-type farmers. 
Overall, we expect a negative sign for δ1, a positive sign for δ2, and a negative sign for δ3. 
Because the urban workers favor the switch regardless, they enter the regression without 
any conditioning. We expect a positive sign for δ4.  In terms of control variables in this 
equation, macroeconomic instabilities and foreign reserve bottlenecks have intensified in 
the later periods of the closed regimes and in most cases fostered the switch. Most 
countries also experienced decreasing economic growth rates. We expect to capture these 
effects with the levels and lags of inflation rate, the change in the share of foreign reserves 
in GDP, and per capita income growth. In addition, the IS policies are less likely to work 
with small domestic markets (Krueger, 1978). Thus we also use the log of the population of 
the countries as a control.  
 
In the second equation, we test whether the farmers migrate after the switch. We expect γ2 
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to be negative and γ4 to be positive. In terms of control variables, Larson and Mundlak 
(1997) argue that countries that are ethnically fractionalized and ones with larger surface 
area, less civil liberties and lower life expectancy are less likely to experience internal 
migration. 
 
The third equation tests the inequality effects of the switch. The coefficient φ1 would show 
the pure change in Gini that arises from the policy switch, without depending on any other 
variable in the model. The next two regressors test the impact of agricultural tastes on 
inequality. Given that α is interacted with ISEP, the coefficient φ2 would capture the impact 
of α on Gini in the closed period, and φ3 would capture the same effect in the open period. 
Our model, as well as Anbarci and Ulubasoglu (2005a), predicts that α has an equilibrating 
effect in closed economies. So we expect φ2 to be negative. The model also predicts that α 
does not affect Gini after the switch, so φ3 should be insignificantly estimated.19 How does 
α increase inequality after the switch then? Theoretically, it is the gap between α itself and 
the international agricultural prices that determines the extent of the increase in inequality 
after the switch. That is, the more agricultural the society is before the switch (as shown by 
higher α), the higher is the inequality after the switch due to switching to a more “distant” 
regime (i.e., to much lower agricultural prices). International agricultural prices apply 
uniformly to every “open” economy, so the stand-alone ISEP variable can capture this 
effect in the estimation, among other effects. If the coefficient φ1 is estimated to be 
positive, some of this effect should belong to the international agricultural prices. The next 
composite regressor in the model tests the effects of relative productivity on inequality. To 
recognize the fact that relative productivity of the migrant worker to that of the initial 
worker can impact the ‘national’ Gini at the extent of the rate of migration out of 
agriculture, we interact this composite term with migration rate. As per control variables in 
this equation, we first use various dummies to control for the construction of the Gini data 
(see Section 4.4). Additionally, Schultz (1998) argues that regional dummies can explain 
important variations in the levels of Gini. Furthermore, Li et al. (1998) argue that financial 
development (as measured by M2/GDP), civil liberties, land Gini and initial education 
level are relevant political economy and credit constraints factors that can affect inequality. 
We utilize the first two in the analysis, while education is already taken into account with 
                                                          
19 We model the level of Gini, not the change in Gini, for several reasons. First, there is a voting case here on 
a closed or an open regime, and in an integrated setup, we need to utilize both regimes explicitly. Secondly, 
modeling the change in Gini eliminates the level effect in Gini, for which our theoretical predictions may be 
relevant. After all, with the level of Gini, too, can we test our predictions.  
 18
the ratio of rural to urban schooling, which Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2005) show is related 
to the overall education level in the society. We use land Gini in the robustness analysis as 
it might be correlated with both α and β. Indeed, Ulubasoglu and Cardak show that land 
Gini is a significant determinant of rural years of schooling. 
 
Several versions of these equations are estimated with different composition of the control 
variables to check the sensitivity of the results. 
 
3.2. Short-term vs Long-term Implications of the Switch 
Following common practice, we structure our data set in five-year intervals, such as 1960-
64, 1965-69, etc. This is to minimize the guess work and the measurement errors in the 
data. Thus, if, for instance, a country opened in the period 1970-1974, the post-switch 
effects are analyzed for the period 1975-1979 and onwards. Specifically, we investigate the 
relationships by focusing on 10-year, 20-year, 30-year and 40-year periods around the 
switch. When the focus is on 10-year, we look at the last five-year period before the switch 
and the first five-year period after the switch. This is important because in this way we can 
investigate which threshold values of α and β would result in higher or lower inequality just 
after the switch and start a particular tendency in Gini. Likewise, when the focus is on a 30-
year period, we look at the last three five-year periods before the switch and the first three 
five-year periods after the switch, and so on.20 This is useful to observe the sustainability of 
the regimes over time, migration behavior of the farmers as well as the changes in the 
income distribution in the long-run. Where necessary, we also focus on what happens in 
each period (esp., on the impact of β on inequality).  
 
3.3. Estimation Methodology 
We first estimate the ISEP equation with maximum likelihood probit,21 and the migration 
and inequality equations with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). These simple methodologies 
                                                          
20 All the countries provide data for the 10-year focus. Not all countries have data for the 20-year or 30-year 
focus, etc. In the 20-year case for instance, we include all countries with 10-year focus as well as those which 
provide data up to 20 years (some imbalance in the panel may occur, because while a country may provide 
data for only one period before the switch, it may provide for two of the periods after the switch).  
 
21 Sachs and Warner (1995) set five criteria for a country to be considered as open: i) average tariff rates 40% 
or less, ii) non-tariff barriers covering 40% or less of trade, iii) black market premium on the exchange rate 
less than 20%, iv) no state monopoly on major exports, and v) not being a socialist system. Thus, the ‘true’ 
level of openness υψ += Xy* is determined by an index function, Xψ, and a country is considered as open 
(y=1) if it exceeds an ‘arbitrarily’ set threshold (i.e., statistical arbitrariness), or closed (y =0) otherwise. 
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are useful in understanding the model behavior and getting a sense of the data. 
 
Note, however, that the system specified above is a triangular system, which may require a 
more involved estimation methodology. In a triangular system, the first dependent variable 
is determined by exogenous factors; the second dependent variable is determined by the 
first dependent variable and the exogenous factors; and so on. The estimation of this system 
requires an instrumental variable (IV) estimation if there is any contemporaneous 
correlation among the residuals of the each equation. Otherwise, each equation can be 
estimated singly with OLS, which would provide consistent coefficient estimates. To check 
if there are any cross-equation residual correlations, we conduct a Breusch-Pagan (1980) 
test. As per this test, the OLS residuals of each equation are regressed onto each other first 
(i.e., the residuals from the first equation are regressed on the residuals from the second and 
the third equations). Then the number of observations times R-squared from this estimation 
is used as a Chi-squared statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions (in this case, three). In our case none of the various system combinations 
indicate such correlation, so ML probit and OLS can be used for consistent estimations.22 
 
Nevertheless, the data on the proportion of rural population with no schooling and 
secondary schooling are available as one data point for almost every country. So for the 
panel estimations, we have no chance but assume that each country has the same data for 
each period. To address possible measurement error problem, we use Rivers and Vuong’s 
(1998) two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2CML) method for the estimation of 
the ISEP equation. 2CML is a convenient method in that it also provides an exogeneity test 
en route. In this method, rural no schooling and secondary schooling are first regressed on 
a set of instruments (see below), and then the residuals from these auxiliary regressions are 
plugged back to the ISEP equation. If the residuals are estimated significantly in the second 
stage, then there is an endogeneity problem to address. In all of our cases, however, these 
residuals are estimated to be individually and jointly insignificant. Thus the use of simple 
probit is justifiable. The same problem is handled in the migration equation by using a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. GMM is robust to heteroskedasticity 
of unknown form that might be in the measurement error. The GMM estimations provide 
somewhat better results than the OLS results, possibly because the instruments used in 
                                                          
22 The results are available upon request. 
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addressing the problem provide some variation in the regression. In this sense, we cannot 
make strict conclusions on the measurement error problem, but in this way a caution is 
taken at least. As instruments, we use variables suggested by Ulubasoglu and Cardak 
(2005), who model the determinants of rural educational attainment. They find that asset 
inequality (measured by land Gini), financial development (measured by M2/GDP),  ethnic 
fractionalization, life expectancy, political freedom, colonization and surface area, among 
others, are significant determinants of cross-country differences in rural schooling. We also 
add regional dummies to this list  as well as the interaction terms of all these variables. All 
these variables can be expected to be unrelated to the error terms. A relatively small and 
consistent number of instruments used for both ISEP and migration equations. 
 
Country-specific effects may also require an attention in a panel context. We feel relatively 
better off on this problem, because we decompose the sample into relatively homogenous 
group of countries (see Section 4.1 below). In addition, we account for region-specific 
effects by using Latin American, South African and East Asian-Pacific dummies as well as 
examining all the effects separately for Sub-saharan Africa. Countries within each region 
can be reasonably assumed to have similar characteristics.23 
 
There is an important point about the ISEP equation. Estimation of this equation in a panel 
context assumes that there is voting every period on a choice to remain closed or open. This 
assumption is quite plausible due to the probability of countries’ reverting back to their old 
regimes (due to various reasons such as public pressure, military interference and economic 
failure). In fact, a number of countries switched back and forth in the 1950s and 1960s 
(e.g., Costa Rica, Ecuador, Morocco, Turkey) as shown in the Sachs-Warner-Wacziarg-
Welch context. While due to the unavailability of the relevant data we cannot include many 
of the back-and-forth cases in our data set, one country in our sample (Sri Lanka) has 
indeed two switches. Thus the coefficients from a probit estimation of the ISEP equation 
would indicate the probabilistic support for the switch.  
 
Note that although we estimate each equation singly, we make the ‘same’ data points 
                                                          
23 The matter can be dealt with econometrically in several ways: i) a dummy variable for each country can be 
used, but this would result in enormous loss of degrees of freedom; ii) the model can be estimated in a 
differenced form, but this would eliminate any long-run effects in the estimations, which should be a very 
significant source of information in our context. 
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available to each equation (in terms of countries and time periods) so that the results can be 




A detailed description of the data and their sources are provided in Appendix C. However 
some important issues are explained in this section. 
 
4.1. Issues about Sample Selection 
To carry out the empirical analysis, we need all the data for both closed and open periods 
(i.e., necessarily around the switch period; the more, the better). However, the underlying 
framework in our model is an economic dualism where migration upon opening, which is 
fostered by regional income gaps, results in changing inequality within countries. In this 
sense, the best testing environment for our theory would be developing economies that had 
(or have) dualistic nature, and experienced both closed and open periods. Though the sort 
of dualism and its implications on inequality that exist in our model are not like the 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) type, the sample of countries that they use can be our 
starting point for the empirical analysis. Ideally, we would like to use all countries they use; 
but our samples do not match one-to-one due to our having to have data for both closed and 
open periods. We are able to find 27 such developing countries. These developing countries 
are well-known with their import-substitution and export-promotion experiences, and 
nearly all of them exhibited a tendency of internal migration after opening.  
 
Additionally, 13 Sub-saharan African countries have the desired data and thus can be used 
to explore various important implications. Moreover, the dualism experienced by today’s 
developed countries were in distant past.25 However since data were readily available for 
three countries, we also used them to see how the model performs with developed country 
data. But only three countries do not change the results. 
 
                                                          
24 A perfect correspondence of the data points is of course impossible, due to the lack of other data. 
 
25 Industrialization and rural-urban income differential periods in US, UK, France, Germany, Norway are 
explained in Lindert (2005) and Morrisson (2005). In these countries even opening within the context of 
Sachs - Warner (1995) and Wacziarg - Welch (2003) during 1950s and 1960s did not result in incentives for 
mass migration due to little or non-existent regional income gaps and thus a change in inequality. 
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4.2. Issues about ISEP 
The switching year for each country is of utmost importance. Sachs and Warner classify the 
trade regimes of nearly every country in the world as closed or open with respect to certain 
criteria. Wacziarg and Welch further investigate this variable.26 Further, Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000) closely and excellently examined this variable by partitioning it into its 
original components. They note that most of the variation in this variable is captured by 
black market premium, which is an indicator of poor domestic policies in closed regimes. 
Hence, they conclude that "the Sachs and Warner indicator serves as a proxy for a wide 
range of policy and institutional differences", a qualification desirable for our analysis.27, 28  
 
4.3 Issues about Inequality Data 
We use the latest available data on inequality, which is provided by the WIDER project of 
the United Nations University (dated June 2005). This is a compilation of various 
inequality estimates, mainly from i) an updated version of Deininger and Squire (1996), 
provided by the World Bank, ii) Luxembourg Income Study, and iii) Transmonee of 
UNICEF/ICDC. The compilation is fully documented and the unit definitions are as precise 
as possible in line with various earlier criticisms. For this newest compilation, some 
estimates from earlier compilations have been deleted, some have been replaced with new 
estimates, and some new estimates have been made available through an apparently tedious 
work. UNU/WIDER also provides quality indicators for each estimate depending on the 
reliability of the original source. Most data points have either income deciles or quintiles. 
In particular, two Gini values are made available: i) the Gini value reported by the original 
source, ii) UNU/WIDER’s calculation from income deciles/quintiles. While we use the 
latter in our estimations, the correlation between both measures in our sample is 0.99. 
 
Using this data set, our purpose is to create a consistent inequality series (over 5-year 
intervals) for each country to obtain comparable values over time. At the very least, the 
                                                          
26 While both studies agree on the openness years for many countries, there is a disagreement on India. Sachs-
Warner classify India as open as of 1994, while Wacziarg-Welch consider it still closed as of 2003. We 
experiment with both cases. 
 
27 For a few countries the opening year is the last year of a five-year period (e.g.., 1989), thus these countries 
are assumed to have opened in the next period.  
 
28 If the opening year is the last year of a 5-year period, then the country is assumed to have opened in the 
next 5-year period. 
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within-5-year observations should be consistent (i.e., no averaging should be made over 
different constructions). Where Gini values of different constructions need to be used 
across time periods, we control for these differences through dummies (see Barro 2000, 
who does the same). These dummies are Consumption/Expenditure, Earnings, Monetary 
Income, Net Income, Person, and Gini Quality (a value between 1 through 4, where 1 
shows the best quality). Econometrically speaking, though, because Gini is a dependent 
variable, any measurement error will be captured by the error term. Construction of this 
series is explained in detail in Appendix D. 
 
4.4. Issues about β 
β is the relative productivity of migrant workers to that of initial workers in manufacturing. 
For our purposes the ratio of rural to urban average years of schooling (henceforth, 
RATIO) serves as a plausible proxy for β. Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2005) provide an 
unbalanced panel data set for 57 countries on the rural and urban average years of 
schooling. Because no detailed information (such as the breakdown of age groups, rates of 
birth and mortality etc. into rural and urban) was available to obtain a time series, most 
countries have one data point. Luckily, however, most data were available for the countries 
around their respective opening years. 
 
31 of our 43 countries have their own RATIO data. For the remaining 12 countries we 
made approximations from altogether 57 countries of Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2005). Our 
approximations are mostly based on Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), who 
approximated the income distribution data of 33 countries for the whole world based on the 
countries’ geographical proximity and similar and/or common histories and cultures. These 
approximations are provided in Appendix E.29  
 
The relative productivity variable in the ISEP equation, which is relevant for the high-type 
farmer at every period of voting (βIS), is found in the following way: For 37 of 43 countries, 
the RATIO data are available either at the switching period or before. For countries whose 
data are available before opening, we assume that RATIO increases (i.e., rural-urban 
education gap closes) by 2% every five years (e.g., from 0.50 to 0.52) up to the switching 
                                                          
29 For most countries, educational attainment data were available for people over 25 years of age, which is 
consistent with voting and migration decisions.  
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period (i.e., in the closed economy). For the remaining six countries (of which three are 
developed), RATIO is available after opening, so we assume that RATIO increased by 3% 
every five years after having opened.30 Thus we backcast the data accordingly. These 
values are implied by Ulubasoglu and Cardak’s modeling of the RATIO variable.   
 
It is very important to note, however, that in a panel context the evolution of migrant 
workers’ productivity in manufacturing after opening will be different than βIS. The 
relevant relative productivity variable is βEP. Once we obtain the RATIO data at the switch 
period (through the procedure above), for panel analysis we proceed with calculating βEP. 
We construct various βEPs by assuming different rates of increase in the relative 
productivity after the switch. In doing so, we also acknowledge the fact that in the initial 
period just after the switch, the productivity increase may be lower than future periods due 
to the adaptation difficulties that ex-farmers may experience in the city, etc. In particular, in 
terms of the combination of “the first five-year period just after the switch” and “each of 
the later five-year periods”, we try combinations of 2%-5%, 5%-8%, 6%-10%, 7%-12%, 
8%-15%, 10%-20%, 15%-25%, and 20%-30%. In another exericise, we construct another β 
with sub-saharan African countries having 5%-8% and both developing and developed 
countries having 7%-12%. In another β construction, we use 2%-5% for the countries with 
real output per capita up to $1,500 in the switch period, 7%-12% for countries with $1,501-
$4,000, and 8%-15% for countries with $4,001 and above.  
 
Using various such combinations is a robustness check on this variable. Also, if we invest 
some belief in the trueness of the theory, β constructions that are estimated to be significant 
in the regressions would indicate the true productivity changes after the switch. It turns out 
that while the combination 5%-8%  used for all countries provides the most significant 
results, the combinations through 5%-8% to 10%-20% provide statistically significant 
estimates in the regressions. This would imply that migrant workers in general experience a 
5% to 10% productivity increase in the first five years just after the switch and an 8% to 
20% increase in each of the later five-year periods. 
  
There is also the issue of the productivity of different migrant stocks that exist in the city. 
To illustrate, take the case of the first 15 years after the switch. In the third five-year period 
                                                          
30 We also experiment with 3% increase before opening and 4% and 5% increase after opening. The results 
are mostly similar. 
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after the switch, there would be three different β values in the urban area (one for those 
who migrated in the first period after the switch, one for those who migrated in the second 
period after the switch, etc.). Assume that the ratio of rural to urban schooling at the time of 
the switch is 0.50. Thus the first batch of migrants migrates to the city with a 0.50 
productivity, and realizing, say, an 8% increase in the relative productivity by working in 
the manufacturing in the first period, they finish off the first period with a beta value of 
0.58. From the second period onwards, they start increasing the relative productivity by, 
say, 15%, i.e., finish the second period with a β of 0.73, and the third period with 0.88, and 
so on. Regarding the second batch of migrants who move to the city in the second period 
after the switch, we first assume that the ratio of rural to urban schooling increases (i.e. 
rural-urban educational gap closes) by 3% every five years under an open economy. Thus 
the second batch of migrants move to the city with a relative productivity of 0.53. They 
finish off their first period in the city (i.e., the second period after the switch) with a beta of 
0.61 (where, at the time, the first batch finishes the same period with 0.73). From this 
period onwards, the second batch starts increasing their β by 15%. Likewise, the third batch 
migrates with 0.56 initially, and finishes their first period with 0.64 (the third period of the 
switch), and so on. 
 
Note that when the migration rate is different in each period after the switch, the change in 
the relative productivity of the each batch of migrants can affect the ‘national’ Gini at the 
extent of the migration rate specific to that period. Thus, we weight each batch with their 
specific migration rate in affecting the ‘national’ Gini.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables 1a through 1d in Appendix F report the results for the ISEP equation, Tables 2 
presents the results for the migration equation, and Tables 3a through 3c focus on the 
inequality equation. Each equation is estimated with the all countries sample first (i.e., with 
Sample 1). In general this sample provides insignificant results. Thus, all Sample 1 can tell 
is that countries should not be treated equally in their role in the data generating process. 
We do not report these results to save space. Next we proceed with Sample 2, which 
includes all countries but Sub-saharan (SS) African effects are separated with SS Africa 
dummies. In many ways, this sample provides the most interesting results. Note that in 
separating the SS African effects, the variables that are not interacted with SS Africa 
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dummies capture the effects for the developing and the three developed countries, while the 
terms interacted with the SS Africa dummies capture the differences between the group of 
developing and developed countries and that of the SS African countries.31 While we also 
exercise with only the developing-countries sample (i.e., Sample 3), these results mimic the 
first part of the estimations with Sample 2 (i.e., terms that are not interacted with SS Africa 
dummies), so we do not present them either.32 Because the results with Sample 2 are the 
most telling, we report and discuss these results below. We report the results with the 10-
year, 20-year, 30-year and 40-year focuses. This would facilitate the comparison of the 
short-term and long-term implications of the switch. The reported results are based the β 
combination of 5%-8% (see section 4.4.)  
 
5.1. ISEP Equation 
In Tables 1a through 1d, we observe that there is evidence, when appropriate control 
variables are used, for a positive support of the low-type farmers to the switch in the 
developing countries. Note that while the significance of the positive signs are the strongest 
in the 10-year focus, the significance becomes weaker when the horizons expands. This 
positive sign in the 10-year focus, i.e., the willingness of the low-type farmer to switch to 
the open regime, may then imply that the low-type farmers in the developing countries are 
not all that rational (in the sense of our theory) in the short-term, while this willingness 
becomes insignificant over time.33 The latter may be explained by strong kinship ties in 
these countries. The low-type farmers may expect remittances from their high-type 
relatives who will migrate to urban areas after the switch; the low-type farmers too might 
migrate later if they expect their more successful high-type relatives to hire them at some 
service sector jobs in which trust relationships may be more important than education or 
aptitude. Importantly, however, there is a significant evidence for the SS African low-type 
farmers providing significantly lower support to the switch. This may be interpreted as the 
SS African low-type farmer being more rational in the short-run. 
                                                          
31 Regressions with lagged variables can only include New Zealand as a developed country (i.e., the ISEP 
equation), because the lagged data are missing for Australia and Japan, which opened in the 1960s. Dropping 
New Zealand and other countries does not change the results. Thus for the ease of explanation, we will refer 
to the developing and developed countries group as “developing countries” only. 
 
32 The results are available upon request. 
 
33 Strict verification of the theoretical (and the forward-looking) behavior of the low-type farmer requires a 
negative sign; however, in reality an insignificant effect is also plausible. 
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The high-type farmers of the developing countries, on the other hand, behave in exactly the 
same way that our theory predicts. They support the switch when β is high and α is low. 
While the evidence is valid for all time periods, it is particularly strong for the later periods. 
The behavior of the SS African high-type farmers, on the other hand, depends on controls. 
When inflation and growth are controlled for, they provide a more positive support on the 
basis of β (predicted) in the 10-year focus. There is also evidence for their positive support 
to the switch on the basis of α (contrary to the model) in the 30- and 40-year focuses.34 In 
these counties, farmers either produce grains for their self use or engage in poducing of 
cash crops. Thus, high-type farmers may be tempted to migrate to urban areas because of 
the pull of the better manufacturing job opportunities but not necessarily because of the 
push of cheaper grain imports. 
 
There is also some evidence for the predicted positive support of the urban workers in the 
developing countries in the short-run (see Table 1a), but this depends on the control 
variables, in particular, the contemporanous value of the change in the foreign exchange 
reserves (FX/GDP). This support is not observed in the later time periods. Recall that in our 
theoretical model the main reason the workers support EP is the lower agricultural prices 
under EP.  In reality, this effect may be small and consequently their support may be small 
too.  Also, in time, increasing competition from migrant low-skilled workers may cause 
this weak support to erode.  The behavior of the SS African urban workers is observed to 
be similar, although under one specification (where inflation and growth are controlled), 
the support is significantly more positive. 
 
There are various other effects that can affect the regime switch. Control variables, in this 
sense, are observed to strengthen the significance of the state (theoretical) variables. In 
terms of contemporanous values of the macro variables, lower inflation, higher FX reserves 
(although weakly) and higher economic growth are more likely lead to the switch. On the 
other hand,  high inflation of one-period lag and lower growth of two period lag foster the 
switch. These results imply that, while failures in the past may accelarate the switch, 
countries in general switch in the period that is macroeconomically more stable. The effect 
of larger domestic markets is estimated to be insignificant in this particular approach.  
                                                          
34 Only one SS African country (i.e., Ghana) provides data for the 30-year focus, while no SS African country 
provides data for the 40-year focus. In this case, this result with 30- and 40-year focuses is due to the SS 
African effects from earlier periods, in addition to some more variation provided by developing countries in 
the 30- and 40-year periods. 
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5.2. Migration Equation 
Table 2 reports the results for the migration equation. Next to each general OLS model for 
a particular time period is the GMM estimation of that model. The 10-year estimations (i.e., 
the first five year period after the switch) do not provide any significant results. This might 
be due to the lack of variation in rural no-schooling and secondary schooling on the right-
hand side.35 However, we do obtain significant estimates for later periods, possibly because 
the instruments used in addressing the measurement error in rural schooling provide some 
variation in the estimation. The stand-alone terms of rural no-schooling and secondary 
schooling capture the effects in developing countries before the switch, while the 
interaction terms of ISEP and rural no-schooling and secondary schooling capture the 
effects after the switch. The results for the Sub-saharan African farmers are mixed, and 
depend on the estimation methodology and the instruments selection in the GMM 
estimation. Therefore we do not discuss these results.36 Focusing on developing countries, 
we obtain positive and significant signs for secondary schooling. Thus the prediction that 
the high-type farmers would migrate to city if the switch takes place is verified for the 
period of 5-20 years after the switch. For the low-type farmers, there is no significant 
evidence for any behavior after the switch. This insignificance can indicate at least that 
they are not significantly favourable to migrating to the city after the switch.37 
 
Note that there is also consistent evidence that the high-type farmers opt for staying in 
agriculture in the closed economy period, as shown by negative and significant coefficient 
estimates of secondary schooling. This implies that, as long as the actual regime is closed, 
there is little incentive for an educated farmer to migrate to the city in the long-run. A 
similar tendency is observed for the low-type farmers, but this effect does not survive the 
inclusion of control variables. 
 
Some control variables also provide insightful signs. We find that countries with higher life 
expectancy and that are less ethnically fractionalized experience higher internal migration. 
 
                                                          
35 Possibly due to this lack of variation, the econometric implementation of the GMM estimation for the 10-
year focus does not converge. Thus the results with 10-year focus should be interpreted cautiously. 
 
36 The results for the developing countries farmers arerobust with respect to the instruments selection. 
 
37 Recall that although the low-type farmers provide positive support to the switch in voting, this effect is only 
realized in the short-term (the 10-year focus, i.e., the first five-year period after the switch); in the longer term 
the support becomes insignificant. 
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5.3. Inequality Equation 
The results for the inequality equation are full of implications. Let us first discuss the 
results on developing countries. A very important finding is that EP regimes, on average - 
and when other factors are controlled -, have higher inequality in the long-run. The 
coefficient estimate of the stand-alone ISEP variable tends to be positive but weakly 
significant for the first five-year period after the switch, but the significance increases over 
the second, third and fourth five-year periods. This may be due to the relatively higher 
wages offered initially to almost all new-workers because of the expansion in the export 
(manufacturing) sector.  In time, the highly skilled may differentiate themselves from the 
rest and may start earning much more. However, this long-run effect becomes weaker with 
the inclusion of regional dummies in the regression; this implies that region-specific effects 
are effective in mitigating (stand-alone) inequality effects of liberalization. 
 
In terms of our state variables, α is estimated to have a significant inequality decreasing 
effect before the switch. As shown in the first three columns of Tables 3a-3c, throughout all 
periods, α is estimated to have the expected negative sign. Again as expected, the 
interaction term of α with ISEP is estimated to be insignificant, implying that α does not 
affect inequality after the switch. When coupled with the positive coefficient of ISEP, these 
results suggest that a country with too high α would experience higher inequality after the 
switch.  When we account for Latin American and South Asian effects, the equilibriating 
effect of α in the closed economies becomes insignificant, but making the post-switch 
effect positive (significant in some cases). This, too, increases the inequality.  
 
One of the most important results is related to the impact of β on inequality. In the first 
five-year period after the switch, β has a robust, negative and significant effect on 
inequality. To illustrate the impact, let us use the first column in Table 3c, where all the 
effects are visible. The estimated coefficient is -0.735. At the median migration rate for the 
first five-year period after the switch (12.59%), a β that is equal to 1 decreases inequality 
by 9.25 Gini points (-0.735×12.59×1) over the Gini value of the last period of the closed 
economies. This effect can on its own surpass the stand-alone switch effect, which is 
estimated to be 6.24 higher Gini points. Thus, for this particular specification, a minimum β 
value of 0.67 would result in decreasing inequality after the switch. As it turns out, 
evaluated at the median migration rates, β values between 0.67 - 0.89 may be taken as 
minimum thresholds, after which liberalization would result in lower inequality in the first 
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period after the switch, holding other factors constant. Region-specific effects lower, 
although cannot terminate, the effectiveness of β on inequality in the first period.  
 
The βs of other periods capture the marginal impact of β on inequality over the previous 
period.38 There is an interesting cyclical behavior observed in the impact of β in the second 
and third five-year periods after the switch, although this behavior is weakly significant. In 
the second five-year period after the switch, β is estimated to increase inequality to some 
extent, where Gini still remains under the pre-switch level. Accounting for regional effects 
strengthens this inequality-increasing effect. In the third five-year period after the switch, 
this increase in counter-acted, although weakly, in similar magnitudes, but this counter-
action is further weakened by regional effects.  
  
In terms of control variables, both financial development and political freedom have 
significant inequality decreasing effects without accounting for regional effects. Of interest, 
the inequality difference between the most dictatorial and the most democratic regimes 
(i.e., a political freedom score of 0% to 100%) is between 6 - 9 Gini points, other things 
being equal. Both financial development and political freedom effects, however, become 
insignificant when Latin America and South Asia effects are controlled for.39   
 
It turns out that region-specific effects have important influence on  the working of both 
state and control variables on inequality. Importantly, while these effects decrease the 
stand-alone inequality effect of the switch, they clearly slow down the inequality 
decreasing effect of β. The realm of these effects would be an important topic of research 
for future studies. 
 
Let us now discuss the results on Sub-saharan Africa. The stand-alone effect of the switch 
is no different than that in developing countries (i.e., still positive). However, α is estimated 
to have a robust, significant and inequality-increasing effect in the closed period. The post-
switch effect is also different than developing countries under some circumstances. There is 
significant and inequality-decreasing effect of α after the switch, when the region-specific 
                                                          
38 This is because the dummies ISEP5, ISEP10, ISEP15 and ISEP20 are designed to capture the evolution in 
relative productivity of each batch of migrants, where ISEP5 has four 1s in the 40-year focus for each 
country, ISEP10 has three 1s, and so on. 
 
39 Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) arrive at the same conclusion for the financial development and growth link. 
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effects are fully controlled for. This implies that higher α may decrease inequality in SS 
Africa after the switch!  
 
The results on β are even more interesting. The impact of β on inequality in the first five-
year period after the switch is no different than developing economies (i.e., the inequality 
decreasing effect in this period still holds). However, in the second and third five-year 
periods after the switch, β has even more stronger inequality decreasing effect than is 
observed in developing countries.40 This effect is strongest when the region-specific effects 
are fully controlled for. To illustrate, let us focus on the fifth column in Table 3c. The 
effect in the first five-year period after the switch is no different than developing 
economies, so at the median β (0.42) and the median migration rate (4.21%), Gini 
decreases by 0.81 points (-0.459×4.21×0.42). In the second five-year period, median β is 
0.37 and the median migration rate is 3.58%; thus Gini further decreases by 2.28 points. In 
the third five-year period (which is only observable for Ghana), β is 0.24 and the migration 
rate is 6.28%. Thus Gini decreases by 5.52 (-3.665×6.28×0.24). Thus the overall 
conclusion on SS Africa is that the impact of β on inequality is spread across time, and this 
effect offsets the stand-alone effect between 10-15 years, holding other factors constant. 
This may be due to lack of good instant education and training opportunities in Sub-
saharan Africa, where only slow learning-by-doing effects may be present. Another 
interesting result is that higher political freedom worsens income distribution in SS Africa, 
other things being equal.     
 
Other important implications of our inequality estimation are regarding Gini constructions. 
In particular, Gini constructions that are based on expenditure or consumption are on 
average 14 points lower than income-based constructions. Person-based Ginis (vis-a-vis 
household-based Ginis) provide higher inequality (around 3.5 to 5 points) when the 
regional effects are controlled for. This is expected, because household-based Ginis do not 
take into account within-household inequality. Also, net income-based constructions (as 
opposed to gross income-based constructions) provide lower inequality outcomes (i.e., 
around 2 to 4 points). This is also expected because, taxation schemes are generally 
progressive. Moreover, Ginis based on monetary income (as opposed to overall income) 
                                                          
40 There are five SS African countries in our data set whose second period effect we can observe, while there 
is only one SS African country to observe the third period effects. Note that for all countries, we can observe 
the previous periods’ effects. 
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provide lower inequality (around 3.5 to 5.5 points), while earnings based-constructions are 
not statistically different. Finally, Ginis with lower quality may indicate higher inequality, 
although this effect is generally insignificant.  
 
6. FURTHER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
We conduct further sensitivity analyses using the 10-year and 40-year focus estimations. 
The first is on India. The reported results include India as a country which experienced 
openness in the 1995-99 period (as per Sachs and Warner). Following Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003), we now consider India as a closed economy and remove it from the sample. This 
does not change any of the results in the inequality equation. In the ISEP equation, only the 
significance of the high-type farmers worsens in the 40-year focus, although remaining at 
acceptable levels. Other variables in both 10-year and 40-year focus remain similar, like 
those in the migration equation. 
 
Next we check whether using different time periods for each country results in any time-
wise parametric shift in the models. The circumstances leading to and surrounding the 
switch may be different in each time period. Such effects can be captured by using time 
dummies for the 1970s, 80s, 90s and for 2000s in the regressions. The ISEP equation is 
perhaps the most relevant for such effects, in terms of reflecting the over-time tendency 
across the world in switching the regimes. As compared to the base period of the 1970s,41 
the effect is insignificant in the 1980s, but significant and increasingly positive in the 1990s 
and the 2000s. The inclusion of these dummies worsens the significance of the high-type 
farmers’ coefficients, but they still remain at acceptable levels. In the inequality 
regressions, the dummies are insignificant when the region-specific effects are controlled 
for. This implies that region-specific effects eliminate inequality, and this effect is time-
persistent. When the regional effects are not accounted for, the dummies of 1990 and 2000 
are positive and significant. However, in all cases do our theoretical variables remain 
significant with the original signs. The same dummies are estimated to be insignificant in 
the migration equations.  
  
One can also argue that the contemporanous values of the macro variables may be 
endogenous to the regimes. Note that when we refer to macroeconomic instabilities, we 
                                                          
41 The 1960s are eliminated from the sample due to lagged variables.  
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refer to a bundle of complex and interrelated fiscal and monetary factors. While such 
factors may lead to a change in the regime, the reverse causation from the regime to the 
macro factors is tied to many parameters. For instance, while a country may experience 
high inflation in the IS regime due to monetizing its budget deficit, in the EP regime it may 
experience high inflation due to high economic growth. Also important is the dynamic 
relationships among the macro variables. Most macro variables, such as inflation, are 
characterized with inertia as well as having lead and lag associations with others. Thus, we 
believe that the extent of endogeneity bias, if exists, would be low in our case due to the 
use of lagged macro variables and other macro controls. Nevertheless, a formal testing 
procedure is also undertaken using Hausman (1978) tests, and expectedly, such tests do not 
indicate endogeneity in our estimations.   
  
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The belief that globalization increases income inequality is commonly stated. Given that a 
significant proportion of world’s population has been introduced the “liberal blueprint” in 
the past two decades and that a number of other countries face pressures to liberalize, such 
claims make necessary profound and disaggregate analyses of the liberalization-inequality 
relationship. This study carries out such an investigation with theoretical and empirical 
setups. Of course, the issue involves infinitely many dimensions and a single study can but 
illuminate certain aspects. Nevertheless, we believe that we treat the issue rigorously by 
modelling the society’s decision-making process on liberalization and its ensuing impact on 
inequality. We also undertake an empirical test of the theoretical predictions by making use 
of a newly assembled inequality data set and other interesting variables. Both theoretical 
and empirical results, which complement each other, are indicative of what past 
“liberalizers” have experienced in terms of societal decision-making and income inequality, 
from, of course, the angle that the paper takes. Our findings imply that global policies 
should not be prescribed uniformly across countries, and the prescriptions should take into 
account what Rodrik (2000) calls local knowledge, i.e., country-specific factors. 
 
In our theoretical model we disaggregate the society into four segments: entrepreneurs, 
workers, high-type farmers and low-type farmers. In the import-substitution (IS) regime the 
society considers whether or not to switch to export-promotion (EP). As elaborated in our 
analysis, α and β turn out to be two crucial factors on the society’s switching decision as 
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well as on the pace of inequality after an IS-EP switch. The theoretical results suggest that 
low-type farmers never have incentives to switch. The empirical findings imply that the 
Sub-saharan African low-type farmer behaves in the manner that the theory predicts, while 
the non-Sub-saharan African low-type farmer does the opposite. In addition, theoretically 
high-type farmers have higher incentives to switch to EP as α decreases and β increases. 
The empirical analysis finds support for this prediction in non-Sub-saharan African 
developing countries, while the Sub-saharan African high-type farmer behaves in a mixed 
manner. Continuing with the theory, entrepreneurs and initial urban workers always 
support the switch. The empirical results show that urban workers provide such a support 
only in the short-run. We explain why such discrepancies can occur in the theoretical and 
empirical results, and therefore deepen our understanding of the proposed framework.   
 
Theoretically, inequality too depends on α and β; it decreases following a switch if α is low 
and β is high and increases otherwise. Empirically, we find that higher β lowers inequality 
after the switch in all countries, whereas the impact of α differs across country groups. We 
also find that EP regimes, on average, have worse inequality than the IS regimes in the long 
term (i.e., 15-20 years after the switch). Such an effect is insignificant when the attention is 
restricted to a short period after the switch. In developing countries β can offset the stand-
alone effect in the short term if the switch is made with a minimum β value of 0.67 – 0.89, 
given median migration rate. In Sub-saharan Africa, the stand-alone effect can be offset by 
the median β in 10-15 years after the switch. Overall, however, when the estimates are 
evaluated in the whole sample, the β effect cannot surpass the stand-alone effect, which 
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A. INEQUALITY COMPARISONS  
 
Table I. Unconditional Changes in Inequality (number of countries) 



































as of  
2003 
Developing 19 21 8 13 13 5 61 25 
Developed 8 10 3 8 10 3 18 2 
SS Africa 9 11 2 4 7 0 18 8 




1. UNU/WIDER Gini observations with Quality 1-4 are used. For each country the highest possible 
quality data bundle has been utilized. Because the analysis is raw, we stick to only one type of, and 
consistent, Gini construction (see Section 4.3.) for a particular country that provided the longest time 
span.  
2. “Net” refers to the difference in Gini points between the earliest and the latest year available for a 
country (where data are available for different years). If the difference is greater 1 Gini point, then 
the conclusion is a “net rise”, and vice versa. No change means that this difference is between -1 and 
1. 
3. Opening years are taken from Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  
4. The analysis is raw and relies on data availability (i.e., on an unbalanced panel). Thus, the measures 
are rough measures of the changes in Ginis. 
 
 
B. THEORETICAL PROOFS 
PROPOSITION 1: In IS: 
(1) The entrepreneur’s income is YeIS = ΒmIS = (½)3/2. 
A worker’s income is YwIS = em wm = (½)3/2. 
(2) A farmer’s income is YaIS = ½ ((1-A)/A) (∀/(1-∀)) (½)1/2. 
(3) YeIS = YwIS > YaIS. 
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) A skilled worker’s utility maximization problem can be 
rewritten as 
uw = Lw cw, where cw = a∀ m1-∀ stands for the composite consumption good, 
such that cw = wm (1-Lw). 
First order conditions from this problem yield wm Lw = cw.  Plugging cw into the constraint 
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we get 
Lw* = ½, and thus esw = ½.      (1.1) 
By assumption, Le = 1, ese = 0. 
First-order conditions of Βm yield ½ (em)-1/2 - wm = 0.  Thus, demand for labor per 
entrepreneur is edm = (1/2wm)2.  But esw = ½ (and ese = 0).  Thus, equating edm and esw, the 
equilibrium manufacturing wage becomes 
wm = (½)1/2.        (1.2) 
Thus, by using (1.1) and (1.2), we get ΒmIS = (½)1/2 - ½ (½)1/2 = ½ (½)1/2.  (1.3) 
Hence, again by using (1.1) and (1.2) we get, ew wm = ½ (½)1/2.   (1.4) 
(2) Let ΒaIS denote the farmer’s profit and wa denote the farmer’s wage.  Observe that 
YaIS = ΒaIS + wa ea = pad e1/2      (1.5) 
where ΒaIS = pad e1/2 - wa ea. 
A farmer’s utility maximization problem can be rewritten as 
ua = La ca, where ca = a∀ m1-∀ stands for the composite consumption good, 
such that ca = wa (1-La). 
First order conditions from this problem yield wa La = ca.  Plugging ca into the constraint we 
get 
La* = ½, and thus esa = ½.      (1.6) 
Thus, as = (½)1/2.        (1.7) 
First order conditions from any agent i’s utility maximization problem yield 
ai = ∀ YiIS/pad.        (1.8) 
Since there are two sectors, it follows from Walras’ law that, if one of the markets is in 
equilibrium, then so is the other one. 
Using (1.5) and (1.8), the farmers’ total demand for the agricultural good becomes  
A ∀ YaIS/pad = A ∀ (½)1/2.      (1.9) 
Using (1.4) and (1.8), the workers’ total demand for the agricultural good becomes 
[(1-A)/2] ∀ YwIS/pad = [(1-A)/2] ∀ ½ (½)1/2/pad.    (1.10) 
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Using, (1.3) and (1.8), the entrepreneurs’ demand for the agricultural good becomes 
[(1-A)/2] ∀ YeIS/pad = [(1-A)/2] ∀  ½ (½)1/2/pad.    (1.11) 
Then, by using (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11), total demand for the agricultural good becomes 
A ∀ (½)1/2 + (1-A) ∀ ½ (½)1/2/pad      (1.12) 
Using (1.6), the total supply of the agricultural good becomes 
A (½)1/2.        (1.13) 
Then, using (1.12) and (1.13) (i.e., equating the total demand and supply of the agricultural 
good) yields 
(1-A) ∀ ½ (½)1/2/pad  = A (1-∀) (½)1/2.       
By simplifying it, we get 
pad  = ½ ((1-A)/A) ∀/(1-∀).      (1.14) 
Then, by using (1.7) and (1.14)  
YaIS = ½ ((1-A)/A) [∀/(1-∀)] (½)1/2.     (1.15) 
(3) This part follows directly from Parts 1 and 2 of this proposition.  This completes proof 
of Proposition 1. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: In IS,  ueIS = 2uwIS and uwIS/uaIS = [A(1-∀)/(1-A)∀]; thus, ueIS/uaIS = 2 
[A(1-∀)/(1-A)∀].  Thus,  ueIS > uwIS > uaIS. 
Proof of Proposition 2:  First order conditions from any agent i’s utility maximization 
problem yield his/her demand for the manufacturing good: 
mdi = ∀ YiIS.        (2.1) 
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that 
by (1.8) ai = ∀ Yi IS/pad, 
by (1.1), Lw* = ½, and thus esw = ½, by assumption, Le = 1, ese = 0, by (1.5) La* = ½, and thus esa = 
½, 
by (1.3) Ye IS = ½ (½)1/2, by (1.4) Yw IS = ½ (½)1/2, by (1.15) Ya IS = ½ ((1-A)/A) [∀/(1-∀)] (½)1/2,  
Thus, a farmer’s indirect utility is uaIS= (½) ∀∀(1-∀)1-∀ (1/pa)∀ ½((1-A)/A) [∀/(1-∀)] (½)1/2 (3.1) 
 41
Thus, the worker’s indirect utility is uwIS = (½) ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pa)∀ ½ (½)1/2. (3.2) 
Thus, the entrepreneur’s indirect utility is ueIS= ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pa)∀ ½ (½)1/2. (3.3) 
Then, simple comparisons of (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) conclude our result.  This completes 
proof of Proposition 2. 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  In IS, the Gini coefficient is G(YIS) = A - ∀. 
Proof of Proposition 3: By Part 3 of Proposition 1, YwIS = YeIS > YaIS (as long as ∀ <  A).  
Let YIS  be the average income in IS.  By Proposition 1, YeIS = (½)3/2, Yw = (½)3/2, and YaIS = ½ ((1-
A)/A) (∀/(1-∀)) (½)½.  Let C = (½)3/2.  Thus, YIS  = C[(1-A)/2 + (1-A)/2 + A ((1-A)/A) (∀/(1-∀))] = 
C[(1-A) + (1-A) (∀/(1-∀))] = C[(1-A)/(1-∀)].  Let si denote segment i’s population share.  Thus, se 
= (1-A)/2 = sw and sa = A.  Let ti = Yi/YIS.  Thus, te = (1-∀)/(1-A) = tw and ta = ∀/A.  Given these 
definitions, Gini can be calculated as follows (see equation (5) on p. 888 of Mookherjee and 
Shorrocks (1988): G(YIS) = ½ [Εh Εk sh sk ⏐th - tk⏐].  Thus, ½ [(A(1-A)/2)⏐(1-∀)/(1-A) - ∀/A⏐4] = 
(A(1-A)⏐(1-∀)/(1-A) - ∀/A⏐ = A(1-∀) - ∀(1-A) = A - ∀.  This completes proof of Proposition 3. 
 
PROPOSITION 4:  In EP, 
(1) YeEP = ΒmEP = (1+2kA∃/(1-A)) ½ (½)1/2. 
(2) YwEP = em wm = ½ (½)½. 
(3) YnEP(∃) = em ∃ wm = ½ ∃ (½)½. 
(4) YaEP(,) = pai (ea)1/2 = pai (½)½. 
(5) YaEP(∃) = pai (ea)1/2 = pai (½)½. 
(6) YnEP(,) = em , wm = ½ , (½)½. 
(7) YeEP > YwEP > YnEP(∃) > YaEP(,); in addition, YnEP(∃) > YaEP(∃) and YnEP(,) < YaEP(,). 
Proof of Proposition 4: (1) First-order conditions of Βm’ yield ½ (em’)-1/2 - wm’ = 0.  There 
is one skilled worker per entrepreneur and 2A/(1-A) unskilled (migrant) workers per entrepreneur.  
Thus, the total demand for labor is 
(1+2A∃/(1-A)) edm = (1+2A∃(1-A)) (1/2wm)2.    (4.1) 
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By (1.1) in the proof of Proposition 1,  
Lw* = ½, and thus esw = ½.      (4.2) 
Thus, wm = (½)1/2.       (4.3) 
Then, using (4.2) and (4.3), 
YeEP =  ΒmEP = (1+2A∃/(1-A)) (½)1/2 - (1+2A∃/(1-A)) ½ (½)1/2 =  
(1+2A∃(1-A)) ½ (½)1/2   .   (4.4) 
(2) Using (4.2) and (4.3) 
YwEP = ew wm = ½ (½)1/2   .    (4.5) 
(3) Using (4.2) and (4.3) 
YnEP(∃) = en ∃ wm = ∃ ½ (½)1/2   .   (4.6) 
(4) As specified in the main text, 
YaEP(,) = pai e1/2.       (4.7) 
(5) As specified in the main text,  
YaEP(∃) = pai e1/2.       (4.8) 
(6) Using (4.2) and (4.3) 
YnEP(,) = en , wm = , ½ (½)1/2   .   (4.9) 
(7) The first part follows from (4.4) - (4.7).  The second part follows (4.6) - (4.9) and our 
assumptions that , < pai and  pai < ∃ < 1.  This completes proof of Proposition 4. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: In EP, ueEP > uwEP > unEP(∃) > uaEP(,); in addition, unEP(∃) > uaEP(∃) and 
unEP(,) < uaEP(,).   
Proof of Proposition 5: Mimic the proof of Proposition 2 using YiEP to find the indirect 
utilities of each agent. 
ueEP = ∀∀(1-∀)1-∀(1/pai)∀(1+2kA∃/(1-A)) ½ (½)1/2.    
 (5.1) 
uwEP = (½) ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pai)∀ ½ (½)1/2.      (5.2) 
unEP(∃) = (½) ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pai)∀ ½ ∃ (½)1/2.     (5.3) 
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uaEP(,) = (½) ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pai)∀ pai (½)1/2.     (5.4) 
uaEP(∃) = (½) ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pai)∀ pai (½)1/2.     (5.5) 
unEP(,) = (½) ∀∀ (1-∀)1-∀ (1/pai)∀ ½ , (½)1/2.     (5.6) 
Then, simple comparisons of (5.1) - (5.6) yield our result.  This completes proof of 
Proposition 5. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3: By Part 7 of Proposition 4, YeEP > YwEP > YnEP(∃) > YaEP(,).  Let YEP  
be the average income in EP.  By Proposition 4, YeEP = ΒmEP = (1+2kA∃/(1-A)) ½ (½)½, YwEP = em 
wm = ½ (½)½, YnEP(∃) = em ∃ wm = ½ ∃ (½)½, and YaEP(,) = pai (ea)1/2 = pai (½)½.  Let E = (½)½.  
Thus, YEP = E(1-A+2kA∃+(1-k)Ap).  Let si denote segment i’s population share.  Thus, se = (1-A)/2 
= sw, sn = kA and sa = (1-k)A.  Given these definitions, Gini can be reformulated from the one 
provided by Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1988): G(YEP) = ½ [Εh Εk sh sk ⏐YhEP - YkEP⏐]/YEP.  
Lengthy and tedious calculations yield 
G(YEP) = [A(1-A) + 2kA2∃ - k2A2∃ - kA∃(1-A)/2 - (1-k)Ap + (1-k)2A2p]/(1-A +2kA∃ + (1-k)Ap).
 (T2.1) 
Thus, )G = G(YEP) - G(YIS)  
= [A(1-A) + 2kA2∃  - k2A2∃ - kA∃(1-A)/2 - (1-k)Ap + (1-k)2A2p]/(1-A +2kA∃ +(1-k)Ap) - (A-∀). (T2.2) 
The derivatives are long and cumbersome.  We will omit the derivations of them.  The reader can 
verify them through Mathematica. 
(1) ∂()G)/∂∀ = 1.  
∂()G)/∂∃ = - (Ak)2/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap) < 0. 
(2) Even the simplified expressions of ∂()G)/∂A and ∂()G)/∂k are several lines.  We omit 
them here.  (We can provide them upon request.) 
∂()G)2/∂∃∂k = - 2A2k/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap) - A3k2p/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap)2 < 0. 
∂()G)2/∂∃∂A = - 2Ak2/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap) - A2k2/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap)2 < 0. 
∂()G)3/∂∃∂k∂A = -2Ak[A/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap)2 + 2/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap) + A2pk/(1-A + kA∃ 
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+ (1-k)Ap)3 + Apk/(1-A + kA∃ + (1-k)Ap)2] < 0.  This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
 
C. DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Income Gini: Income Gini index; 0-100 scale; obtained from UNU/WIDER (2005) 
IS-EP: dummy variable; obtained from Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003). 
Migration rate: rate of decline in agricultural labor force, adjusted for population growth in the 
country; 0%-100% scale; calculated following Larson and Mundlak (1997). 
Agricultural labor force: obtained from FAO web site (www.fao.org) and World Development 
Indicators (WDI) CD-ROOM (1999, 2003).  
Rural Schooling: Share of rural population with no schooling, primary schooling and secondary 
schooling; 0%-100% scale; obtained from UNESCO Educational Yearbooks (various 
issues).  
FX/GDP: Percentage change in the share of foreign exchange reserves, including gold, in GDP; 
obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
Political Freedom: political rights and civil liberties index; 0-100 scale; political freedom index for 
the years 1960 and 1965 is obtained from Bollen (1990) in a 0-1 scale, from 1972 onwards, 
the average of political rights and civil liberties index of Gastil index 
(www.freedomhouse.org) is used. Both indices are transformed in to the 0-100 scale, where 
100 denotes the most democratic regimes. 
Population growth rate: obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
Agricultural GDP: obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
Agricultural imports and exports: obtained from FAO Trade Yearbook (various issues). 
Rural and urban years of educational attainment: obtained from Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2005). 
Inflation: rate of change in GDP deflator; 0%-100% scale; obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
Population: obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
Ethnic Fractionalization: 0-100 scale; obtained from Alesina et al. (2003). 
Life Expectancy: obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
Area: Geographical surface area in square kilometers; obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
M2/GDP: in 0%-100% scale; obtained from WDI CD-ROM (2003). 
 
D. INEQUALITY DATA FOR ESTIMATIONS 
 
Using the UNU/WIDER’s (2005) compilation of inequality data, we build a consistent inequality 
series for each country over 5-year intervals. First, population coverage “All” is preferred over the 
other coverages. Then, a higher quality construction is preferred over the others. Next, for a given 
quality, gross income is taken as benchmark (gross income is preferred over monetary income, 
earnings, if multiple constructions exit for a country for a specific year). Household is usually the 
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appropriate unit of analysis for inequality studies (Kuznets, 1973), and thus is stuck to. But if 
person-based Ginis would provide a consistent series, then they are preferred. Expenditure and 
consumption are taken as same, while a distinction is made between income, monetary income and 
earnings (note that a further distinction is made between net and gross). Finally, different 
constructions are corrected with dummies (expenditure/consumption, net income, monetary 
income, earnings, person, and Gini quality).   
 
E. APPROXIMATION OF THE β DATA 
 
Countries Beta data matched Countries Beta data matched 
    
Australia New Zealand 1981 (*) Kenya Kenya 1969 
Bangladesh Bangladesh 1981 Korea, Rep. Korea, Rep. 1970 
Bolivia Bolivia 1992 Madagascar Cameroon 1976 
Brazil Brazil 1980 Malaysia Malaysia 1970 
Burkina Faso Mali 1975 Mali Mali 1975 
Cameroon  Cameroon 1976 Mauritania Mali 1976 
Chile Chile 1970 Mexico Brazil 1980 (*) 
Colombia Colombia 1973 Morocco Tunisia 1984 (*) 
Costa Rica Costa Rica 1973 Nepal Nepal 1981 
Cote d'Ivoire Mali 1975 New Zealand New Zealand 1981 
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic, 1970 Panama Panama 1980 
Ecuador Ecuador 1970 Peru Ecuador 1970 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Egypt 1986 Philippines Phillippines 1995 
El Salvador El Salvador 1971 South Africa South Africa 1970 
Ethiopia Ethiopia 1994 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka 1981 
Ghana Mali 1975 Tanzania Kenya 1969 (*) 
Guatemala Guatemala 1973  Tunisia Tunisia 1984 
Honduras Honduras 1974 Turkey Turkey 1993 
India India 1991 Uganda Kenya 1969  
Indonesia Indonesia 1980 Venezuela Venezuela 1990 
Jamaica Canada 1991 Zambia Zambia 1980 
Japan Japan 1970   
 
 
Notes:   
1. Those in bolds are approximated. (*): Approximation by way of Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(2002). 
2. The variety of countries available to us for approximation (57 countries available for 12) is greater 
than Bourguignon and Morrisson (33 countries for the whole world), so we do not use all of their 
approximations. 











F. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Table 0. Summary Statistics (10-Year Focus) 
 Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. ‡ 
Gini+ 46.97 47.00 61.00 30.00 8.36 55 
β 0.51 0.49 0.93 0.13 0.16 56 
α (%) 17.95 16.79 51.50 3.75 10.88 56 
Migr. Rate (%) 12.23 12.28 26.04 0 6.02 56 
RurNoSch. (%) 49.99 45.90 98.70 0.90 25.16 54 
RurSecSch. (%) 6.19 3.50 29.70 0.50 7.78 50 
FMV 0.36 0 1 0 0.48 56 
Developing 
Countries 
WMV 0.64 1 1 0 0.48 56 
Gini+ 33.71 33.88 41.60 27.80 5.38 6 
β 0.93 0.92 1 0.87 0.06 6 
α (%) 7.87 8.15 14.45 2.18 4.69 6 
Migr. Rate (%) 16.98 18.01 28.22 6.53 8.66 6 
RurNoSch. (%) 1 1 1 1 0 6 
RurSecSch. (%) 26.70 30.10 30.10 19.90 5.27 6 
FMV 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Developed 
Countries 
WMV 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Gini+ 50.07 48.35 77.30 36.15 11.99 26 
β 0.33 0.39 0.62 0.06 0.16 26 
α (%) 31.65 31.04 54.31 4.37 14.66 26 
Migr. Rate (%)  4.92 3.31 19.92 0 5.96 26 
RurNoSch. (%) 84.14 79.50 97.50 59.90 12.64 26 
RurSecSch. (%) 1.30 0.63 5.60 0.20 1.63 20 
FMV 0,92 1 1 0 0.27 26 
SS African 
Countries 
WMV 0.08 0 1 0 0.27 26 



























Table 1a. ISEP Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) - 10 Year Focus 
        
 Dependent Variable: ISEP 
FMV*RurNoSch. 0.004 0.021 0.010 0.003 0.014 0.023 0.024 
 (0.47) (1.81)* (0.86) (0.30) (1.16) (1.76)* (1.78)* 
FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (1.02) (1.49)* (1.06) (0.96) (1.54)* (1.64)* (1.64)* 
FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. 0.123 0.263 0.162 0.132 0.239 0.289 0.290 
 (1.02) (1.71)* (1.11) (0.93) (1.62)* (1.79)* (1.81)* 
WMV -0.016 0.876 0.390 0.113 0.719 0.911 0.914 
 (0.03) (1.73)* (0.54) (0.17) (1.05) (1.54)* (1.54)* 
Afr.*FMV*RurNoSch. -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.014 -0.010 -0.018 
 (0.74) (1.02) (0.89) (0.52) (1.75)* (1.22) (0.32) 
Afr.*FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.020 0.011 0.006 
 (0.26) (0.86) (0.73) (0.52) (1.16) (1.10) (0.22) 
Afr.*FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. -0.049 0.235 -0.121 -0.055 1.533 0.167 0.137 
 (0.16) (0.38) (0.23) (0.20) (2.45)** (0.25) (0.18) 
Afr.*WMV 0.000 0.114 0.046 0.129 0.463 0.029 -0.608 
 (0.000) (0.32) (0.11) (0.41) (2.12)** (0.07) (0.15) 
FXRes/GDP  0.730    0.545 0.547 
  (2.09)**    (1.55)* (1.52)* 
FXRes/GDP(-1)  0.553    0.626 0.627 
  (1.35)    (1.40)* (1.40)* 
FXRes/GDP(-2)  -0.939    -1.111 -1.110 
  (1.55)*    (1.33) (1.32) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP  -1.090    -0.888 -0.927 
  (2.45)**    (1.94)* (1.81)* 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-1)  -0.287    -0.271 -0.312 
  (0.61)    (0.52) (0.55) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-2)  0.435    0.406 0.339 
  (0.46)    (0.35) (0.29) 
Infl.   -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
   (1.55)*  (1.38) (1.00) (0.96) 
Infl.(-1)   0.008  0.019 0.011 0.011 
   (1.82)*  (1.69)* (1.20) (1.16) 
Infl.(-2)   -0.010  -0.024 -0.012 -0.012 
   (0.90)  (1.34) (0.74) (0.74) 
Afr.*Infl.   -0.019  0.004 -0.014 -0.014 
   (1.32)  (0.56) (1.05) (1.03) 
Afr.*Infl.(-1)   0.008  -0.142 -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.39)  (2.56)*** (0.06) (0.08) 
Afr.*Infl.(-2)   0.010  0.149 0.025 0.025 
   (0.44)  (2.49)** (0.89) (0.92) 
Growth    0.098 0.139   
    (1.94)* (2.26)**   
Growth(-1)    0.048 0.095   
    (1.33) (2.41)**   
Growth(-2)    -0.100 -0.132   
    (2.44)** (2.39)**   
Afr.*Growth    0.022 0.421   
    (0.28) (1.82)*   
Afr.*Growth(-1)    -0.197 -0.511   
    (2.86)*** (3.77)***   
Afr.*Growth(-2)    0.122 0.163   
    (1.86)* (2.12)**   
Ln(Pop.)       0.003 
       (0.05) 
Afr.*Ln(Pop.)       0.053 
       (0.15) 
Observations 74 68 68 70 68 66 66 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.01 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.41 0.25 0.25 
Marginal effects reported. Absolute value of the robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant if z statistic is greater than 1.4; ** 
significant if greater than 2; *** significant if greater than 2.5.        
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Table 1b. ISEP Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) - 20 Year Focus 
 Dependent Variable: ISEP 
FMV*RurNoSch. 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.011 
 (0.68) (0.79) (1.14) (0.45) (1.04) (1.65)* (1.67)* 
FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 (1.84)* (1.58)* (2.07)** (1.98)* (2.22)** (2.04)** (2.03)** 
FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. 0.162 0.181 0.150 0.210 0.109 0.175 0.181 
 (1.92)* (1.69)* (2.24)** (1.99)* (2.31)** (2.29)** (2.28)** 
WMV 0.093 0.259 0.260 0.108 0.229 0.532 0.561 
 (0.18) (0.42) (0.54) (0.19) (0.64) (1.15) (1.18) 
Afr.*FMV*RurNoSch. -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 
 (1.15) (0.55) (1.62) (0.99) (1.57)* (1.38) (0.37) 
Afr.*FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.010 
 (1.20) (1.15) (1.80)* (1.48)* (2.64)*** (1.87)* (0.61) 
Afr.*FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. -0.255 0.086 -0.171 -0.264 0.238 -0.027 -0.013 
 (0.93) (0.16) (0.59) (0.93) (0.93) (0.07) (0.03) 
Afr.*WMV -0.048 0.175 0.033 -0.108 0.080 0.079 -0.529 
 (0.19) (0.72) (0.20) (0.38) (0.74) (0.47) (0.14) 
FXRes/GDP  0.659    0.317 0.325 
  (2.49)**    (1.63)* (1.63)* 
FXRes/GDP(-1)  0.589    0.202 0.208 
  (2.38)**    (1.00) (1.02) 
FXRes/GDP(-2)  -0.184    -0.391 -0.400 
  (1.11)    (1.77)* (1.77)* 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP  -0.950    -0.535 -0.580 
  (2.67)***    (2.01)** (1.80)* 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-1)  -0.341    0.076 0.049 
  (1.08)    (0.30) (0.16) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-2)  -0.396    -0.119 -0.181 
  (0.76)    (0.28) (0.35) 
Infl.   -0.001  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (1.37)  (1.27) (0.91) (0.86) 
Infl.(-1)   0.004  0.004 0.003 0.003 
   (1.42)  (1.57)* (1.09) (1.05) 
Infl.(-2)   0.002  0.000 0.004 0.004 
   (1.77)*  (0.53) (1.97)* (1.96)* 
Afr.*Infl.   -0.011  -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 
   (1.38)  (0.89) (1.21) (1.19) 
Afr.*Infl.(-1)   0.000  -0.015 0.001 0.001 
   (0.00)  (1.14) (0.06) (0.05) 
Afr.*Infl.(-2)   0.007  0.019 0.011 0.010 
   (0.95)  (1.57)* (0.93) (0.82) 
Growth    0.098 0.038   
    (2.93)*** (2.78)***   
Growth(-1)    0.047 0.030   
    (1.57)* (2.33)**   
Growth(-2)    -0.115 -0.050   
    (3.60)*** (3.44)***   
Afr.*Growth    0.007 0.054   
    (0.10) (1.44)*   
Afr.*Growth(-1)    -0.082 -0.062   
    (1.84)* (2.48)**   
Afr.*Growth(-2)    0.097 0.037   
    (2.15)** (1.35)   
Ln(Pop.)       0.006 
       (0.17) 
Afr.*Ln(Pop.)       0.029 
       (0.17) 
Observations 125 116 114 118 114 112 112 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.35 0.22 0.22 
Marginal effects reported. Absolute value of the robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant if z statistic is greater than 1.4; ** 




Table 1c. ISEP Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) - 30 Year Focus 
 
 Dependent Variable: ISEP 
FMV*RurNoSch. 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.59) (0.56) (1.08) (0.04) (1.03) (1.05) (1.08) 
FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
 (2.16)** (2.05)** (2.12)** (2.20)** (2.31)** (2.23)** (2.19)** 
FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. 0.185 0.209 0.103 0.231 0.104 0.069 0.076 
 (2.25)** (2.16)** (2.28)** (2.20)** (2.46)** (2.37)** (2.31)** 
WMV -0.009 -0.034 0.064 -0.312 0.058 0.024 0.037 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.24) (0.57) (0.23) (0.14) (0.20) 
Afr.*FMV*RurNoSch. -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.35) (0.95) (1.75)* (1.31) (2.19)** (1.62) (0.18) 
Afr.*FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.006 
 (1.23) (1.33) (1.95)* (1.46)* (2.71)*** (2.11)** (0.96) 
Afr.*FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. -0.250 -0.101 -0.172 -0.256 0.176 -0.064 -0.063 
 (0.96) (0.19) (0.87) (0.96) (0.75) (0.41) (0.37) 
Afr.*WMV -0.155 0.014 -0.002 -0.134 0.062 0.017 0.049 
 (0.67) (0.06) (0.02) (0.53) (0.71) (0.26) (0.08) 
FXRes/GDP  0.360    0.051 0.055 
  (1.65)*    (0.74) (0.74) 
FXRes/GDP(-1)  0.240    0.012 0.013 
  (1.49)*    (0.19) (0.18) 
FXRes/GDP(-2)  -0.029    -0.101 -0.110 
  (0.20)    (1.41)* (1.42)* 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP  -0.677    -0.135 -0.145 
  (2.20)**    (1.46)* (1.38) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-1)  -0.062    0.096 0.106 
  (0.24)    (0.99) (0.84) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-2)  -0.543    -0.108 -0.113 
  (1.13)    (0.69) (0.65) 
Infl.   -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (1.34)  (1.46)* (1.09) (1.05) 
Infl.(-1)   0.003  0.003 0.002 0.002 
   (1.36)  (1.58)* (1.15) (1.12) 
Infl.(-2)   0.003  0.002 0.003 0.003 
   (1.70)*  (1.24) (1.81)* (1.76)* 
Afr.*Infl.   -0.008  -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
   (1.35)  (1.21) (1.36) (1.28) 
Afr.*Infl.(-1)   0.000  -0.018 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.02)  (2.13)** (0.20) (0.19) 
Afr.*Infl.(-2)   0.005  0.021 0.007 0.007 
   (0.83)  (2.41)** (1.00) (0.86) 
Growth    0.064 0.022   
    (2.34)** (2.18)**   
Growth(-1)    -0.000 0.004   
    (0.02) (0.42)   
Growth(-2)    -0.073 -0.025   
    (3.25)*** (2.72)***   
Afr.*Growth    0.060 0.074   
    (0.95) (2.45)**   
Afr.*Growth(-1)    -0.038 -0.034   
    (0.93) (1.56)*   
Afr.*Growth(-2)    0.058 0.021   
    (1.46)* (1.17)   
Ln(Pop.)       0.003 
       (0.21) 
Afr.*Ln(Pop.)       -0.004 
       (0.07) 
Observations 160 150 148 153 148 145 145 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.16 0.29 0.21 0.21 
Marginal effects reported. Absolute value of the robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant if z statistic is greater than 1.4; ** 
significant if greater than 2; *** significant if greater than 2.5.        
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Table 1d. ISEP Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) - 40 Year Focus 
 Dependent Variable: ISEP 
FMV*RurNoSch. 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.52) (0.29) (0.90) (0.16) (0.61) (0.91) (0.96) 
FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
 (2.47)** (2.46)** (2.22)** (2.38)** (2.30)** (2.51)*** (2.44)** 
FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. 0.207 0.222 0.157 0.245 0.173 0.124 0.136 
 (2.54)*** (2.49)** (2.32)** (2.35)** (2.36)** (2.59)*** (2.51)*** 
WMV -0.118 -0.262 -0.030 -0.465 -0.102 -0.041 -0.021 
 (0.25) (0.48) (0.10) (0.90) (0.31) (0.17) (0.08) 
Afr.*FMV*RurNoSch. -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
 (1.61)* (1.20) (1.91)* (1.64)* (2.19)** (1.86)* (0.19) 
Afr.*FMV*Alpha*RurSecSch. 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.011 
 (1.55)* (1.44)* (2.41)** (1.59)* (2.90)*** (2.22)** (1.04) 
Afr.*FMV*Beta(IS)*RurSecSch. -0.374 -0.149 -0.438 -0.390 -0.388 -0.127 -0.121 
 (1.45)* (0.27) (2.44)** (1.48)* (2.14)** (0.46) (0.41) 
Afr.*WMV -0.199 -0.060 -0.068 -0.233 -0.046 -0.006 0.093 
 (0.95) (0.25) (0.44) (1.04) (0.24) (0.05) (0.08) 
FXRes/GDP  0.131    -0.009 -0.010 
  (0.65)    (0.08) (0.08) 
FXRes/GDP(-1)  0.167    -0.045 -0.052 
  (1.17)    (0.43) (0.46) 
FXRes/GDP(-2)  0.007    -0.097 -0.107 
  (0.05)    (0.87) (0.90) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP  -0.510    -0.148 -0.155 
  (1.69)*    (0.94) (0.87) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-1)  0.016    0.237 0.260 
  (0.06)    (1.46)* (1.25) 
Afr.*FXRes/GDP(-2)  -0.647    -0.292 -0.304 
  (1.33)    (1.10) (1.04) 
Infl.   -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (1.53)*  (1.80)* (1.55)* (1.48)* 
Infl.(-1)   0.004  0.006 0.004 0.004 
   (1.55)*  (1.93)* (1.56)* (1.49)* 
Infl.(-2)   0.003  0.002 0.003 0.003 
   (1.37)  (1.04) (1.40)* (1.37) 
Afr.*Infl.   -0.013  -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 
   (1.58)*  (1.74)* (1.44)* (1.38) 
Afr.*Infl.(-1)   0.001  -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 
   (0.14)  (1.97)* (0.34) (0.32) 
Afr.*Infl.(-2)   0.010  0.029 0.015 0.016 
   (1.05)  (2.26)** (1.33) (1.15) 
Growth    0.037 0.016   
    (1.56)* (1.10)   
Growth(-1)    0.011 0.012   
    (0.49) (0.86)   
Growth(-2)    -0.074 -0.039   
    (3.55)*** (2.89)***   
Afr.*Growth    0.062 0.073   
    (1.11) (1.80)*   
Afr.*Growth(-1)    -0.079 -0.053   
    (1.91)* (1.67)*   
Afr.*Growth(-2)    0.039 0.022   
    (0.94) (0.84)   
Ln(Pop.)       0.007 
       (0.33) 
Afr.*Ln(Pop.)       -0.010 
       (0.09) 
Observations 183 167 166 172 166 161 161 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.20 0.20 
Marginal effects reported. Absolute value of the robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant if z statistic is greater than 1.4; ** 
significant if greater than 2; *** significant if greater than 2.5.     
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Table 2. Migration Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) 
 Dep. Var.: Migr. Rate -10 Year Dep. Var.: Migration Rate -20 Year Dep. Var.: Migration Rate -30 Year Dep. Var.: Migration Rate -40 Year 
ISEP 3.342 3.492 3.555 0.616 1.234 1.704 -3.716 -3.003 -2.487 -2.201 -2.392 -4.506 -4.502 -4.435 -3.004 
 (0.59) (0.71) (0.82) (0.16) (0.36) (0.53) (0.42) (0.86) (0.80) (0.73) (0.39) (1.40) (1.57) (1.56) (0.64) 
RurNoSch. -0.057 0.017 0.010 -0.065 0.004 0.010 -0.343 -0.081 -0.007 0.003 0.012 -0.087 -0.014 -0.008 0.018 
 (0.82) (0.31) (0.19) (1.31) (0.10) (0.27) (3.130)*** (1.99)** (0.23) (0.08) (0.15) (2.49)** (0.50) (0.28) (0.33) 
ISEP*RurNoSch. -0.025 -0.045 -0.047 0.029 -0.008 -0.016 -0.107 0.077 0.037 0.029 -0.082 0.106 0.068 0.060 -0.073 
 (0.26) (0.58) (0.69) (0.44) (0.14) (0.30) (0.66) (1.36) (0.77) (0.63) (0.97) (1.96)* (1.47) (1.34) (1.01) 
RurSecSch. -0.212 -0.193 -0.193 -0.245 -0.207 -0.182 -1.979 -0.338 -0.288 -0.260 -0.667 -0.339 -0.298 -0.280 -0.706 
 (1.25) (1.18) (1.37) (2.02)** (1.73)* (1.60) (5.87)*** (3.19)*** (2.79)*** (2.57)** (2.39)** (3.64)*** (3.28)*** (3.12)*** (3.23)*** 
ISEP*RurSecSch. -0.107 -0.127 -0.129 -0.030 -0.079 -0.104 1.141 0.148 0.087 0.061 0.475 0.219 0.171 0.152 0.518 
 (0.46) (0.55) (0.63) (0.19) (0.49) (0.69) (3.01)*** (1.03) (0.61) (0.44) (1.50)* (1.59) (1.27) (1.13) (2.13)** 
SS Afr.*ISEP 37.439 1.168 16.041 48.002 26.874 31.942 -239.233 48.615 18.454 6.605 -221.21 50.114 13.424 2.189 -240.703 
 (1.55) (0.03) (0.50) (3.53)*** (1.10) (1.57) (0.58) (3.64)*** (0.73) (0.28) (0.87) (3.77)*** (0.55) (0.11) (0.99) 
Afr.*RurNoSch. -0.071 -0.106 -0.100 -0.054 -0.089 -0.199 -9.183 -0.059 -0.156 -0.346 -5.221 -0.047 -0.188 -0.374 -6.783 
 (1.70)* (0.77) (0.58) (1.63) (0.74) (1.70)* (1.36) (2.06)** (1.26) (2.38)** (0.99) (1.87)* (1.65) (3.12)*** (1.61)* 
Afr.*ISEP*RurNoSch. -0.383 0.013 -0.123 -0.540 -0.294 -0.329 2.538 -0.551 -0.214 -0.073 2.521 -0.587 -0.177 -0.041 2.708 
 (1.43) (0.03) (0.37) (3.44)*** (1.11) (1.53) (0.63) (3.65)*** (0.79) (0.29) (1.01) (3.90)*** (0.67) (0.19) (1.12) 
Afr*RurSecSch. -0.559 -0.675 -0.053 -0.355 -0.483 -1.083 -168.830 0.230 -0.588 -2.308 -89.450 -0.310 -1.277 -2.949 -118.25 
 (0.95) (0.54) (0.04) (0.45) (0.49) (1.45) (1.34) (0.19) (0.56) (2.00)** (0.94) (0.42) (1.46) (3.28)*** (1.56)* 
Afr*ISEP*RurSecSch. -2.931 0.625 -1.067 -3.751 -1.162 -1.893 65.544 -4.390 -0.508 0.381 20.485 -3.920 0.333 1.049 37.235 
 (1.68)* (0.23) (0.43) (2.89)*** (0.63) (0.93) (0.70) (2.76)*** (0.26) (0.18) (0.31) (3.05)*** (0.18) (0.62) (0.65) 
Eth. Frac.  -0.002 -0.048  -0.016 -0.048 -0.017  -0.022 -0.045 0.013  -0.038 -0.053 -0.003 
  (0.06) (1.23)  (0.58) (1.75)* (3.76)***  (0.86) (1.72)* (0.314)  (1.46) (1.80)* (0.07) 
LifeExp.  0.484 0.517  0.395 0.432 0.774  0.406 0.466 0.635  0.421 0.496 0.601 
  (4.57)*** (4.64)***  (5.10)*** (5.20)*** (9.65)***  (5.43)*** (5.77)*** (8.04)***  (6.36)*** (6.72)*** (7.46)*** 
Afr.*Eth. Frac.  0.077 0.343  0.015 0.174 6.844  0.013 0.082 3.225  0.054 0.095 4.500 
  (0.38) (1.12)  (0.08) (0.72) (1.43)*  (0.07) (0.41) (0.80)  (0.32) (0.49) (1.48)* 
Afr.*LifeExp.  0.020 -0.110  0.096 -0.088 -4.674  0.219 -0.013 -0.667  0.250 -0.051 -1.852 
  (0.07) (0.47)  (0.48) (0.44) (1.12)  (1.07) (0.08) (0.18)  (1.33) (0.33) (0.70) 
Ln(Area)   1.213   0.852 0.325   0.642 -0.006   0.486 0.053 
   (1.94)*   (2.03)** (0.47)   (1.77)* (0.01)   (1.43) (0.105) 
Pol. Freedom   0.006   0.013 -0.212   0.006 -0.030   -0.009 -0.022 
   (0.14)   (0.48) (4.93)***   (0.20) (0.79)   (0.38) (0.65) 
Afr.*Ln(Area)   -0.523   0.945 49.578   2.087 22.624   2.389 32.273 
   (0.39)   (0.97) (1.25)   (1.91)* (0.70)   (2.75)*** (1.29) 
Afr.*PolFreedom   -0.165   -0.108 -0.741   -0.055 0.010   -0.028 -0.358 
   (1.59)   (1.29) (0.71)   (0.78) (0.01)   (0.45) (0.60) 
Constant 16.243 -18.283 -33.896 16.759 -11.119 -24.325 9.163 18.544 -9.997 -22.040 -20.696 18.548 -9.937 -20.030 -20.001 
 (4.03)*** (2.07)** (2.97)*** (5.97)*** (1.83)* (2.89)*** (1.00) (7.25)*** (1.76)* (2.85)*** (2.08)** (8.38)*** (2.02)** (2.86)*** (2.21)** 
Estimation Method. OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS OLS GMM 
Observations 73 73 73 125 125 125 99 161 161 161 131 185 185 185 152 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.38 0.26 0.36 0.39 - 0.22 0.34 0.36 - 0.20 0.33 0.36 - 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant if t statistic is greater than 1.4; ** significant if greater than 2; *** significant if greater than 2.5. GMM estimation delivers negative adjusted R-
squared.             
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Table 3a. Inequality Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) - 10 Year Focus 
 
 Dependent Variable: Wider Gini -10 Year 
ISEP 6.565 3.577 5.807 2.158 4.957 3.378 
 (1.09) (0.52) (0.81) (0.38) (0.82) (0.54) 
Alpha -0.373 -0.419 -0.344 -0.138 -0.063 -0.320 
 (2.90)*** (2.87)*** (2.16)** (0.72) (0.30) (1.96)* 
ISEP*Alpha 0.144 0.203 0.096 0.301 0.168 0.199 
 (0.66) (0.86) (0.37) (1.35) (0.74) (0.85) 
ISEP5*Beta(EP)*Migr5 -0.922 -0.689 -0.693 -0.593 -0.666 -0.511 
 (2.79)*** (1.68)* (1.63)* (1.65)* (1.73)* (1.41)* 
Expend. -13.925 -13.463 -14.002 -14.000 -14.208 -13.432 
 (5.53)*** (4.88)*** (5.16)*** (5.01)*** (5.32)*** (4.85)*** 
Person 4.282 3.792 2.454 1.160 -0.487 0.225 
 (1.49)* (1.22) (0.78) (0.34) (0.15) (0.07) 
Net -3.257 -4.067 -4.563 -3.249 -4.078 -3.487 
 (1.38) (1.53) (1.59)* (1.20) (1.36) (1.21) 
Earnings -1.736 -0.528 1.224 -2.494 0.063 0.425 
 (0.42) (0.13) (0.31) (0.61) (0.01) (0.10) 
Monetary Inc. -4.694 -2.693 -0.110 -2.498 -0.167 1.220 
 (0.94) (0.56) (0.02) (0.66) (0.04) (0.29) 
Gini Qual. 2.200 1.951 2.363 1.357 1.438 2.652 
 (1.54)* (1.45)* (1.80)* (1.08) (1.18) (2.05)** 
M2/GDP  -0.124 -0.101 -0.069 -0.009 -0.075 
  (1.88)* (1.47)* (0.99) (0.14) (1.14) 
Pol. Freedom  -0.055 -0.114 0.017 -0.083 -0.082 
  (0.97) (1.77)* (0.29) (0.98) (1.40)* 
SS Afr.*ISEP 4.843 3.665 -7.731 9.465 0.559 -4.671 
 (0.31) (0.22) (0.48) (0.60) (0.04) (0.31) 
SS Afr.*Alpha 0.394 0.342 0.125 0.198 0.013 0.149 
 (3.09)*** (2.44)** (0.72) (1.28) (0.07) (0.87) 
SS Afr.*ISEP*Alpha -0.403 -0.360 -0.053 -0.580 -0.309 -0.178 
 (1.12) (0.93) (0.13) (1.61)* (0.88) (0.48) 
Afr.*ISEP5*Beta(EP)*Migr5 0.515 0.715 0.877 0.559 0.373 0.769 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.42) (0.29) (0.20) (0.39) 
Afr.*M2/GDP   -0.033  0.034 -0.039 
   (0.19)  (0.20) (0.23) 
Afr.*PolFreedom   0.234  0.262 0.223 
   (3.35)***  (2.92)*** (3.40)*** 
Latin Amer.    0.372 6.436  
    (0.11) (1.92)*  
South Asia    -10.270 -5.115  
    (2.19)** (1.03)  
East Asia & Pac.    -11.295 -5.448 -7.365 
    (2.83)*** (1.48)* (2.30)** 
Constant 48.435 57.350 58.364 52.913 51.649 56.367 
 (10.84)*** (8.31)*** (8.53)*** (7.45)*** (7.51)*** (8.28)*** 
Observations 87 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.37 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant if t statistic is greater than 1.4; ** significant if greater than 2; *** 




Table 3b. Inequality Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) – 30 Year Focus 
 Dependent Variable: Wider Gini – 30 Year 
ISEP 6.221 5.512 6.809 2.303 4.107 4.207 
 (1.65)* (1.42)* (1.65)* (0.76) (1.31) (1.21) 
Alpha -0.230 -0.257 -0.241 0.028 0.069 -0.210 
 (2.17)** (2.22)** (1.90)* (0.26) (0.57) (1.86)* 
ISEP*Alpha 0.028 0.019 -0.042 0.197 0.113 0.105 
 (0.17) (0.11) (0.23) (1.53)* (0.86) (0.67) 
ISEP5*Beta(EP)*Migr5 -0.764 -0.631 -0.640 -0.440 -0.465 -0.463 
 (3.76)*** (2.91)*** (2.88)*** (2.49)** (2.55)*** (2.33)** 
ISEP10*Beta(EP)*Migr10 0.258 0.251 0.235 0.260 0.232 0.260 
 (1.31) (1.26) (1.15) (1.68)* (1.47)* (1.43)* 
ISEP15*Beta(EP)*Migr15 -0.190 -0.191 -0.202 -0.094 -0.103 -0.138 
 (1.15) (1.13) (1.14) (0.67) (0.70) (0.87) 
Expend. -14.949 -14.644 -14.843 -15.134 -14.685 -14.693 
 (8.74)*** (8.12)*** (8.26)*** (8.67)*** (8.90)*** (8.39)*** 
Person 5.418 4.411 3.767 2.687 1.690 2.099 
 (3.28)*** (2.52)*** (2.13)** (1.59)* (1.00) (1.20) 
Net -3.915 -4.132 -3.748 -4.523 -4.386 -3.063 
 (2.78)*** (2.87)*** (2.50)** (3.27)*** (2.96)*** (2.13)** 
Earnings 0.065 1.112 1.318 -1.136 -0.130 0.136 
 (0.03) (0.47) (0.56) (0.50) (0.06) (0.06) 
Monetary Inc. -4.938 -3.210 -2.710 -3.195 -2.600 -2.148 
 (1.94)* (1.40)* (1.22) (1.70)* (1.39) (1.12) 
Gini Qual. 0.849 0.460 0.945 -0.297 0.074 1.196 
 (0.96) (0.54) (1.12) (0.38) (0.09) (1.42)* 
M2/GDP  -0.097 -0.069 -0.043 -0.007 -0.033 
  (2.65)*** (1.78)* (1.08) (0.19) (0.92) 
Pol. Freedom  -0.065 -0.100 0.002 -0.044 -0.069 
  (2.07)** (2.94)*** (0.08) (1.26) (2.38)** 
SS Afr.*ISEP 5.354 4.030 -6.480 11.342 2.008 -3.192 
 (0.44) (0.32) (0.51) (0.97) (0.18) (0.27) 
SS Afr.*Alpha 0.309 0.255 0.152 0.099 -0.019 0.169 
 (3.12)*** (2.51)** (1.22) (1.01) (0.16) (1.49)* 
SS Afr.*ISEP*Alpha -0.366 -0.295 -0.048 -0.589 -0.351 -0.218 
 (1.27) (0.98) (0.15) (2.18)** (1.31) (0.74) 
Afr.*ISEP5*Beta(EP)*Migr5 0.696 0.841 1.449 0.493 0.756 1.306 
 (0.44) (0.51) (0.89) (0.32) (0.49) (0.84) 
Afr.*ISEP10*Beta(EP)*Migr10 -0.798 -0.526 -1.647 -0.829 -1.749 -1.797 
 (1.05) (0.65) (2.10)** (1.03) (2.17)** (2.40)** 
Afr.*ISEP15*Beta(EP)*Migr15 -1.649 -1.008 -3.344 -1.457 -3.566 -3.605 
 (1.12) (0.66) (2.30)** (1.02) (2.49)** (2.56)*** 
Afr.*M2/GDP   -0.147  -0.057 -0.152 
   (1.74)*  (0.62) (1.84)* 
Afr.*PolFreedom   0.225  0.226 0.218 
   (4.28)***  (3.55)*** (4.32)*** 
Latin Amer.    0.377 3.574  
    (0.19) (1.86)*  
South Asia    -11.648 -8.930  
    (4.43)*** (3.23)***  
East Asia & Pac.    -11.657 -8.822 -8.458 
    (5.38)*** (4.26)*** (4.60)*** 
Constant 49.503 58.194 58.095 54.142 51.883 55.715 
 (16.53)*** (14.15)*** (14.15)*** (13.45)*** (12.92)*** (13.53)*** 
β* 0.65 0.69 0.85  0.70 0.72 
Observations 183 182 182 182 182 182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.49 0.52 0.45 
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Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant if t statistic is greater than 1.4; ** significant if greater than 2; *** 
significant if greater than 2.5. β* is the minimum level of β, evaluated at the median migration rate, to counter-act the stand-alone inequality 
effect of the switch, holding other factors constant.      
 
 
Table 3c. Inequality Equation - All Countries (SS African Effects Separated) – 40 Year Focus 
 Dependent Variable: Wider Gini – 40 Year 
ISEP 6.237 5.595 6.728 2.081 3.861 4.025 
 (1.78)* (1.52)* (1.72)* (0.77) (1.37) (1.27) 
Alpha -0.239 -0.266 -0.257 0.004 0.054 -0.235 
 (2.61)*** (2.65)*** (2.29)** (0.05) (0.51) (2.36)** 
ISEP*Alpha -0.001 -0.012 -0.067 0.206 0.121 0.111 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.38) (1.78)* (1.00) (0.77) 
ISEP5*Beta(EP)*Migr5 -0.735 -0.595 -0.601 -0.444 -0.459 -0.452 
 (3.72)*** (2.94)*** (2.89)*** (2.81)*** (2.84)*** (2.53)** 
ISEP10*Beta(EP)*Migr10 0.240 0.226 0.207 0.250 0.222 0.256 
 (1.22) (1.15) (1.03) (1.69)* (1.48)* (1.47)* 
ISEP15*Beta(EP)*Migr15 -0.214 -0.205 -0.216 -0.087 -0.094 -0.132 
 (1.27) (1.23) (1.25) (0.63) (0.66) (0.86) 
ISEP20*Beta(EP)*Migr20 -0.071 -0.053 -0.042 0.001 0.009 0.012 
 (0.34) (0.23) (0.17) (0.00) (0.05) (0.06) 
Expend. -14.434 -14.176 -14.235 -14.533 -14.037 -13.887 
 (7.93)*** (7.62)*** (7.69)*** (8.10)*** (8.10)*** (7.77)*** 
Person 4.745 3.961 3.430 2.000 1.207 1.458 
 (3.00)*** (2.40)** (2.05)** (1.30) (0.78) (0.92) 
Net -3.276 -3.138 -2.671 -3.836 -3.586 -1.979 
 (2.45)** (2.26)** (1.86)* (2.93)*** (2.61)*** (1.46)* 
Earnings -0.621 -0.034 -0.029 -1.809 -1.123 -1.048 
 (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) (0.87) (0.51) (0.44) 
Monetary Inc. -5.475 -4.206 -3.960 -3.881 -3.525 -3.396 
 (2.31)** (1.92)* (1.86)* (2.42)** (2.24)** (2.00)** 
Gini Qual. 0.728 0.387 0.818 -0.356 -0.016 1.056 
 (0.93) (0.51) (1.09) (0.55) (0.02) (1.49)* 
M2/GDP  -0.091 -0.063 -0.031 0.001 -0.024 
  (2.58)*** (1.67)* (0.85) (0.03) (0.71) 
Pol. Freedom  -0.061 -0.090 0.001 -0.035 -0.058 
  (2.15)** (3.04)*** (0.05) (1.19) (2.35)** 
SS Afr.*ISEP 4.894 3.742 -5.667 11.539 2.788 -2.288 
 (0.40) (0.29) (0.44) (1.00) (0.25) (0.19) 
SS Afr.*Alpha 0.313 0.270 0.193 0.135 0.023 0.220 
 (3.84)*** (3.01)*** (1.74)* (1.54)* (0.21) (2.15)** 
SS Afr.*ISEP*Alpha -0.336 -0.272 -0.055 -0.615 -0.389 -0.256 
 (1.18) (0.90) (0.17) (2.32)** (1.45)* (0.87) 
Afr.*ISEP5*Beta(EP)*Migr5 0.662 0.782 1.453 0.459 0.772 1.346 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.88) (0.30) (0.51) (0.87) 
Afr.*ISEP10*Beta(EP)*Migr10 -0.753 -0.495 -1.592 -0.775 -1.721 -1.756 
 (1.01) (0.63) (2.04)** (0.99) (2.17)** (2.38)** 
Afr.*ISEP15*Beta(EP)*Migr15 -1.648 -1.073 -3.393 -1.479 -3.665 -3.684 
 (1.13) (0.71) (2.33)** (1.05) (2.57)*** (2.62)*** 
Afr.*M2/GDP   -0.175  -0.077 -0.183 
   (2.33)**  (0.93) (2.50)*** 
Afr.*PolFreedom   0.214  0.218 0.204 
   (4.24)***  (3.52)*** (4.19)*** 
Latin Amer.    1.172 3.931  
    (0.65) (2.18)**  
South Asia    -11.528 -9.378  
    (4.84)*** (3.73)***  
East Asia & Pac.    -11.729 -9.317 -9.510 
    (6.17)*** (4.94)*** (5.91)*** 
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Constant 50.596 58.432 58.230 54.424 51.816 56.027 
 (18.46)*** (15.88)*** (15.82)*** (15.57)*** (14.56)*** (15.86)*** 
β* 0.67 0.75 0.89 - 0.67 0.71 
Observations 211 209 209 209 209 209 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.51 0.54 0.46 
Absolute value of the robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant if t statistic is greater than 1.4; ** significant if greater than 2; *** 
significant if greater than 2.5. β* is the minimum level of β, evaluated at the median migration rate, to counter-act the stand-alone inequality 




Table 4a. The Impact of  β on Gini – Developing Countries – 5 Years After the Switch 
 






















Max. β Jamaica 11.53% 0.93 -6.44 6.73 +0.29 -4.95 3.86 -1.09 
Med. β South Korea 19.62% 0.50 -5.90 6.73 +0.83 -4.50 3.86 -0.64 
Min. β Guatemala 5.73% 0.17 -0.59 6.73 +6.14 -0.45 3.86 +3.41 
Max. Migr. Dom. Rep. 24.83% 0.57 -8.50 6.73 -1.77 -6.50 3.86 -2.64 
Med. Migr. Chile 12.37% 0.55 -4.09 6.73 +2.64 -3.12 3.86 +0.74 
Min.Migr. Nepal 0% 0.29 0 6.73 +6.73 0 3.86 +3.86 
          










Notes: †: the coefficient used is -0.601 from the third column of Table 3c. ††: the coefficient used is -0.459 





Table 4b. The Impact of β on Gini – Developing Countries – 10 Years After the Switch 
 























Max. β Jamaica 10.61% 0.97    -2.44 3.86 -3.53# 
Med. β South Korea 21.61% 0.54 - - - -2.77 3.86 -3.41# 
Min. β Guatemala 7.96% 0.22    -0.42 3.86 +2.99# 
Max. Migr. Dom. Rep. 23.23% 0.61    -3.36 3.86 -6.00# 
Med. Migr. Bangladesh 13.88% 0.54 - - - -1.78 3.86 +2.08 
Min.Migr. Sri Lanka 3.22% 0.76    -0.58 3.86 +3.28 
          
Median Sample 13.88% 0.54 - - - -1.78  
3.86 
 -0.76# 
Notes: β avg: the weighted average β of the first batch of migrants and the second batch of migrants in the 
society, where the weights are respective migration rates. †: no calculation is made due to the insignificance of 
the coefficient (0.207) in the third column of Table 3c. ††: the coefficient used is -0.237 (-0.459+0.222) from 








Table 5a. The Impact of  β on Gini – Sub-saharan African Countries – 5 Years After the Switch 
 
Country Migr. Rate β 
Impact on 
Gini 



















Max. β Zambia 5.27% 0.62 -1.93 6.73 +4.80 -1.50 3.86 +2.36 
Med. β Uganda 1.04% 0.44 -0.28 6.73 +6.45 -0.21 3.86 +3.65 
Min. β Ethiopia 0% 0.11 0 6.73 +6.73 0 3.86 +3.86 
Max. Migr. South Afr. 19.93% 0.45 -5.39 6.73 +1.34 -4.12 3.86 -0.26 






0.22 0 6.73 +6.73 0 3.86 +3.86 
          
Median Sample 4.21% 0.44 -1.11 6.73 +5.62 -0.85 3.86 +3.01 
Notes: †: the coefficient used is -0.601 from the third column of Table 3c. ††: the coefficient used is -0.459 




Table 5b. The Impact of β on Gini – Sub-saharan African Countries – 10 Years After the Switch 
 























Max. β Madagascar 2.15% 0.58 -2.73 6.73 +4 -2.72 3.86 -1.14 
Med. β South Afr. 19.03% 0.52 -21.67 6.73 -20.33# -21.57 3.86 -21.83# 
Min. β Ethiopia 0.4% 0.18 -0.16 6.73 +6.57 -0.16 3.86 +3.70 
Max. Migr. South Afr. 19.03% 0.52 -21.67 6.73 -14.94 -21.57 3.86 -17.71 
Med. Migr. Madagascar 2.15% 0.58 -2.73 6.73 +4 -2.72 3.86 -1.14 
Min.Migr. Mauritania 0% 0.29 0 6.73 +6.73 0 3.86 +3.86 
          
Median Sample 2.15% 0.52 -2.50 6.73 +3.12# -2.44 3.86 +0.57# 
 
Notes: β avg: the weighted average β of the first batch of migrants and the second batch of migrants in the 
society, where the weights are respective migration rates. ‡: the coefficient used is -2.19 (-0.601-1.592) from 
the third column of Table 3c. ‡‡: the coefficient used is 2.18 (-0.459-1.721) from the fifth column of Table 3c. 
#: accumulated effect from the first and second period (otherwise, period-specific effect).  
 Also note that only Ghana can be used in finding the impact of β on Gini for 15 years after the switch. 
Using the coefficients from the third and fifth columns (i.e., -3.393 and -3.665) of Table 3c the analysis above 
can be replicated for the next five-year period. The migration rate in Ghana in the third five-year period after the 
switch is 6.28% and weighted β is 0.31. 
 
